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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Although the amount of recognition that has come to the
social and political thought of S¢ren Kierkegaard has not been
extensive, what scant attention has been paid to this topic has
for the most part been under the assumption that Kierkegaard has
contributed little to our understanding of these areas of life.
The opinion appears to be prevalent that Kierkegaard is intensely
individualistic in a romantic sense, glorying in the primacy of
the individual's interior life and guided by a self-directed
ethic that finds no basis for its decisions outside of the individual, in sharp contrast to most ethical views.

According to this

interpretation, Kierkegaard is an asocial thinker, ignoring the
social and political aspects of human existence.
This view is expressed by the respected H. Richard Niebuhr,
among many others, when in Christ and Culture he corrects what he
takes to be Kierkegaard's individualistic neglect of social concerns.

He asserts that "our decisions are individual, that is

true; they are not individualistic--as though we made them for
ourselves and by ourselves as well as in ourselves.
individualistic in the Kierkegaardian sense."

They are not

1

With regard to the social aspect of Kierkegaard's thought
in general, Niebw1r says that Kierkegaard's philosophy
1

2

gives up the culture problem as irrelevant to faith not because
it is existentialist and practical, but because it is individualistic and abstract, having abstracted the self from society
as violently as any speculative philosopher ever abstracted the
life of reason from his existence as a man.2
According to Niebuhr, Kierkegaard is guilty of wholesale negligence
in that he "abandons the social problem," not because his philosophy
is rightly "insistent on the responsibility of the individual," but
rather because it "ignores the responsibility of the self to and
for other selves."

3

By no means is Kierkegaard only charged with merely ignoring
the social question, however.

According to Marjorie Grene, in her

Introduction to Existentialism, Kierkegaard "rejects philosophically
and personally" any concept of community; "community means outwardness, a denial of self, and therewith falsity, hypocrisy, selfdeceit."4

Grene asserts that Kierkegaard preferred "extremely

simple disjunctions" between self and society; this, combined with
"his antisocial temper," made him favor the view that "turning to
inwardness necessarily means turning to the self as totally isolated from other selves"; Kierkegaard turns !!completely away from
any conception of human community," so that ''there is indeed nothing
but the individual as nothing before God."

5

Grene's Kierkegaard would deny that a positive role for the
social aspect of human life is consistent with religion and integrity.

Kierkegaard, she charges, rejects community as a betrayal of

the self which alone is the proper object of concern.

This attitude

gains him the estimation of being "a small man" in Grene 's eyes.

6

3

In a similar vein, the Dutch philosopher S. U. Zuidema
writes in his book Kierkegaard that Kierkegaard is "an extreme
individualist."

Zuidema explains that for Kierkegaard "what goes

beyond the individual is finite, temporal, external, and relative,
and must be treated as such."

7

Kierkegaard's attitude toward

fellowship and society is one of outright rejection, and the Kierkegardian view takes exception to all social reform movements in
its conservative individualism.
His aristocratic personalism caused him to look dmm upon
the rising socialism of his time. A reform of society is not
necessary, and certainly not a socialistic reform, which would
abolish individuals . . . . Kierkegaard's individualism resulted,
therefore, in an ultraconservative point of view with respect
to all forms of society.8
Not only does Zuidema's Kierkegaard reject political, secular
forms of society, but he is even opposed to any notion of the church
in fellowship:

"Existential solitude cannot be overcome by mutual

fellowship.

Individuals can only encounter each other with their own

hiddenness.

. The idea of a congregation . . . is an illegitimate

anticipation of the future."

9

Zuidema's Kierkegaard resembles that of Grene:

a self-

absorbed philosopher in active opposition to any positive role for
the interpersonal social and political aspects of human existence.
Does Kierkegaard leave himself open to such interpretations?
His individualistic orientation receives ample attestation from both
his mode of life and his writings.

That he was aristocratic, enjoyed

literary and social popularity, lived in comfortable surroundings,
and was well educated, are all matters of record.

The overwhelming,

4

seemingly obsessive emphasis that he placed on the individual both in
his journals and in several published works, taken alongside his vehement polemics against modern social developments, journalism, the
state church, and the "crowd" (which of course is "untruth") seem
destined to cast him forever in the mold of a political conservative,
opposed to any change in the Danish monarchial political society.

He

appears as an aristocrat, protective of class privileges, and as an
individualist who is as unconcerned with interpersonal and institutiona! affairs as he is jealously interested in his own intellectual
and spiritual situation.

Since he also attests that the entire range

of his literary production was intended to deal with the problem of
"becoming a Christian," 10 a condition that he placed at a "heaven
wide" distance from politics, this would seem to mark him as a
. 1 . 11
. de d avo1. d er of t h"1ngs tempera 1 an d po 1"1t1ca
h eaven 1y m1n

Another perspective on Kierkegaard has been offered, however,
radically different from the above.

Kierkegaard's positive orienta-

tion toward social and political concerns is indicated and defended
by Werner Stark, who in his Social Theory and Christian Thought
admitted that in Kierkegaard's writings are to be found "not many
pages . . . given to a discussion of the problems of social life."
Yet, Stark is quick to add that this relative lack "does not mean
that he had no social philosophy . . . . If we look close enough we
are sure to find Kierkegaard's social theory . . . as a set of convictions implied in all his aesthetic and edifying works."

12

Stark

also praises the "sureness of touch" with which Kierkegaard handles

5

.
13
social top1.cs.

Similarly, James Collins, in The Mind of Kierkegaard,
observes that "most of the books and articles written during the
1846-48 period reflect this orientation of Kierkegaard's thought
. l.f
to t h e pro bl ems of pu bl 1.c
1. e. "14

According to Collins, Kierke-

gaard sought to "diagnose and cure

. through his teaching on

the individual" the "widespread social malaise" of his day.

15

Collins is convinced that Kierkegaard not only had a genuine concern
for the public aspect of human life, but that he sought to have a
constructive and corrective influence through his literary output.
It is somewhat surprising in view of the lack of social concern that is held to characterize Kierkegaard's writings that
several other commentators have considered Kierkegaard remarkably
astute with regard to discerning prevailing social conditions and
movements.

According to these writers, Kierkegaard made astonish-

ingly accurate, long-range predictions concerning such occurrences
as the rise of totalitarianisms, the dominance of mass communications
and entertainment, and the secretly "religious" character of fascism
.

an d commun1.sm.

16

\fuat then is to be made of Kierkegaard's views regarding the
social and political aspects of human existence?
a hermit, and a religious recluse?

Is he a quietist,

Is he a politically conservative

apologist for the aristocratic ruling classes and a paragon of
self-centered romantic individualism?

Or is he rather a social

prophet, acutely aware of the nature of social life, its contemporary

6

derangements and their underlying causes, a thinker intimately
aware of the developments of his time and engaged in his own quiet
type of ''social reform"?
The central purpose of this essay is to examine Kierkegaard's
writings, published and private, along with secondary sources to
determine his true relationship to social and political concerns.
After having examined his writings, a Kierkegaard will emerge who
indeed has a positive social and political perspective.

Secondly,

this concern with man as a social being is central to his thoughts,
by Kierkegaard's own declaration.

All of his discussions of the

individual, which have together generated a great deal of misunderstanding in these areas, can actually be seen as having their proper
meaning only in the context of his total view of the person, including
man in his social and political existence.
In order to establish these contentions, I will show the
development of Kierkegaard's social and political views through
time, from his early days as a royalist student and conservative
political editorialist through the period surrounding the 1848
"bloodless revolution" in which a constitutional monarchy was established in Denmark.

Special attention will be given to the pivotal

Corsair incident, in which Kierkegaard was the subject of a merciless
lampooning in the popular press.
In what will emerge, there will be seen to be a toto caelo
difference between Kierkegaard's actual individualism and that
generally attributed to him.

His writings will show that his

7

position is at odds with aristocratic or romantic notions.

He

stresses the individual not to make him the locus of sui generis
authority, but rather to deem him a responsible agent with social
and divine responsibilities.

To understand Kierkegaard as an indi-

vidualist in an egocentric or romantic sense is to seriously misunderstand the focus of his social theory, which is the responsibility of
each individual to social institutions and to overarching norms.
I will also show that Kierkegaard's conservatism is of a
novel sort in comparison to other forms of conservatism, and develops
yet farther from that notion as his thought matures.

He does

not view the existing monarchy as having an unchallengeable claim to
authority, to be preserved at all costs.

Rather, his desire is to

perpetuate certain traditional social relations based on recognition
of derived authority and personal responsiblity, without which neither
an established nor a revolutionary government could prosper.

Kier-

kegaard's view of authority is of great importance in his social and
political thought.
From this study will emerge Kierkegaard's coherent theory of
man in relation to society and the state, a theory integral to Kierkegaard's general view of the human situation.

His sound and consistent

outlook deserves serious consideration both in our estimation of
Kierkegaard and in our own thinking about these crucial dimensions of
human life.
Kierkegaard is a notoriously complex author, who kept his
literary audience guessing as to the authorship of his books with

8

their prefaces and postscripts attributed to pseudonymous authors and
.

e d 1.tors.

17

Kierkegaard entitles the first part of his literary testa-

ment, The Point of View, "The Ambiguity or Duplicity in the Whole
Authorship."

18

In addition to problems raised by this intended

duplicity, Benjamin Nelson reminds us that
established maxims of law and logic warn us against taking anyone's testimony concerning himself at face value. Equally
familiar canons of literary criticism charge us to decide an
author's artistic intention on the basis of his completed
achievement rather than on his inchoate personal history or his
programmatic recollections.l9
Thus, we may take Nelson seriously when he warns "Dare we lend
.
. 1 a wr1.ter.
.
?1120
ere dence to so provocat1.ve
an d para dox1.ca
An

examination and assessment of Kierkegaard's views on the

individual in relation to society and political life will require a
consultation of such principal sources as the Journals, The Present
Age, The Point of View, The Individual, and Of the Difference Between
a Genius and _an Apostle.

His positive social ethic appears most

fully in Works of Love, although it also is treated of in the Present
Age, and the Journals.
The problem arises in how we are to discern the genuine Kierkegaard in view of such doubts as we have raised regarding the prudence
of trusting the personal attestation of such a dialectical and complex
author in his personal "report to history," The Point of View.
In order to discern Kierkegaard's position, it will be necessary to accept The Point of View as representing Kierkegaard's true
central position throughout his works.

To do this of course requires

that we exercise rational faith in his claim that "the contents of

9

this little book affirm, then, what I truly am as an author, that
I am and was a religious author, that the whole of my work as an
. re 1 ate d to Ch r1st1an1ty.
. . .
" 21
aut h or 1s

The acceptance of The Point

of View will justify acceptance of the likeminded religiously
oriented social and political remarks throughout the other works.
The Point of View purports to give perspective to the entire corpus
of Kierkegaardian authorship; positions in this work, such as the
primacy of the religious concerns in his thought, the importance of
the individual, and the dangers of the crowd, are amply represented
in his other works as well, as evidenced in this remark.:
what I

have consistently fought for .

"This is

against every

tyranny, including that of the numerical . . . this is Christianity,
. hb or." 22
an d 1 ove f or one's ne1g

On the other hand, what would follow if, to take the less
daring path, we denied acceptance to Kierkegaard's own testimony
concerning the central emphases of his own authorship?

It would

then not only be impossible to discern the direction of his
sociopolitical thought, but we would also be at a loss to determine
in general whether the true Kierkegaard is "a would-be Don Juan,
a crippled Oedipus, an endogenous manic-depressive with an
atypical career . .

an enemy of the liberal spirit of '48, a

.
.
.
,23
monarch 1st
1. d eogogue, ( or ) a react1onary
ob scurant1st.

As

Nelson counsels,
evidence can be found to sustain many variant versions of his
life but we shall never move with any assurance in the universe
Kierkegaard so cunningly contrived unless we have attempted
the experiment of regarding his Point of View as the decisive

10
. word on his life and authorship.

24

TI1us, if one hopes to make any sense of Kierkegaard's
thought in general and of his social and political perspective in
particular, it will be necessary to take him at his word, tentatively at least, as to his own intentions and emphases.

As I shall

demonstrate, our acceptance of Kierkegaard's interpretation of his
own works, especially the focus on the individual-social dialectic
within the religious context of life, will indeed yield light.
Kierkegaard's positions attested to in Tile Point of View, and
recurring in the Journals and other works, when taken together,
exhibit a consistent, developing view on the relation of the individual to groups and to the state. 25

His positive view of commu-

nity, so overlooked by critics, is developed in full form in Works
of Love, but is found explicitly in The Point of View.

26

As will be

seen, the evidence of Kierkegaard's views and their consistency
throughout his works compels us to accept these attestations as
corroborating similar views in his more dialectical works.

CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN SOCIETY
AND OF KIERKEGAARD'S THOUGHT
Kierkegaard's views on European historical development can
be found both in journal entries and in the book we now have as
The Present Age.

In these writings, Kierkegaard speaks of "world?7

historical stages" as part of the "bringing up of the human race,"which function in the growth of a people in much the same way as
educational and developmental stages function in the growth of an
individual.

28

Although Kierkegaard speaks generically of the human

race, it is clear that he in fact means to exclude from his analysis
.
1
0 r1enta

. . 1"1zat1ons.
.
1129
c1v1

The world-historical stages of what Kierkegaard calls "the
dialectic of community" or the "dialectic of society" can be thought
of as four distinctive periods of Western history, each with its own
characteristic view of the place of the individual in the life of
society and the state.

Each stage is seen to contain within it the

germ of its own dissolution and of the genesis of the next successive stage until the fourth stage is reached, the teleological
terminus of history characterized by a society of individuals in
reciprocal community.
The first stage Kierkegaard calls the "dialectic of antiqUl"t y.

1130

Kierkegaard says of this stage that it is one in which
11

12

"the individuals who relate to each other in the relation are individually inferior to the relation," as are bodily members to a body
or planets to a solar system.

31

The whole is qualitatively superior

to the sum of its constituent members, which derive their significance from the larger whole.

The hallmark of this period in Western

history is the leadership of the great individual, the leader who
3...,

expresses in himself the significance of the people as a whole. '"

In a journal entry, Kierkegaard speaks approvingly of the view that
the king is an individual who "must be regarded as the people
an intensified state-consciousness"; such a king can in utter truth
use the royal "we" as he expresses the state within himself.

33

At the time of Kierkegaard's description of it, he apparently viewed this first stage as the highest and most exalted form
of government, at least from the secular point of view; in 1839 he
said that "ordinary human evolution has monarchy as the intrinsically highest (form), as that to which every other form of the state
.

str1ves.'

,34

A second stage was in the offing, however, a stage which
Kierkegaard calls "the dialectic of Christendom."

35

Of this stage,

Kierkegaard says that "the dialectic of Christendom tends toward
representation." The majority sees itself in its representation
and is "set free" by the consciousness that the government exists
to represent all the people.

36

The Christianizing of Europe has

rendered the older form of monarchy obsolete; people now have
achieved a new measure of dignity given them by the content of

13
Christian teaching no longer to see themselves merely as embodied in
a political entity or great leader.

37

In this stage, "the individ-

uals who relate to each other in the relation are individually equal
in relation to the relation"; as an example, Kierkegaard cites the
partners in a love relationship who remain separate entities, each
one equal in the relationship and bound equally to it by mutual
interest.

38

its parts.

In such a relationship the whole is simply the sum of
Although technically a monarchy, the Danish government as

it existed before the bloodless revolution no doubt qualified or had
begun to qualify as a representative government in this sense.
People saw their relation to the state not as that of serfs to a
great man, but as that of persons of individual worth who were
represented by a government serving their interests.
Kierkegaard by 1839 had come to prefer this perspective on
the monarchy when he maintained that the king is
not a being we should worship; he is a weak, fragile human being
like the rest of us, but he is king by the grace of God, and it
is this religious boundary which limits and terminates the
state, and thereby all that abstract nonsense about the wisest
individual of all is demonlished. . . . Divine governance . . .
calls and designates the individual.39
The first two stages, the dialectics of antiquity and of
representation, are both monarchial, although it is in the former
that monarchy is the most imperial.

It is of :he demise of both

of these stages that Kierkegaard speaks when he asserts that
the dialectic of monarchy is in the lvorld-historical sense
both practiced and established. ~ow we are in the process
of beginning somewhere else, that is, with the intensive
internal growth of the state. Then comes the category "the

14

single individual".
in the future we will have internal
disturbances . . . . It all fits my theory perfectly.40
This third stage Kierkegaard calls "the dialectic of the
present age."

41

Whereas the representative age of Christendom

manifested a change of a primarily political nature from the period
of antiquity, the change to this third period is more of a change
in the social fabric, but with political implications.

In the

dialectic of the present age, people have become "too reflective
to be content with merely being represented."

42

The dialectic of

the present age is marked by a tendency toward achieving social
equality, a legitimate aim except that it seeks to achieve this
equality by means of forming associations, engaging in mass movements, and otherwise resorting primarify to external enforcement.
Social policies of this nature lead to what Kierkegaard has termed
a merely "mathematical equality."

43

Whereas in the first two stages

people were united by a common participation in social life, the
unifying principle of this dismal period is a "negative unity of the
negative reciprocity of individuals"; social cohesion derives not
from an identification with a leader or with the body politic, but
from mutual "envy."
human race,"

45

44

This age is one of a "self-combustion of the

in which social life becomes pathological and politi-

cal activity tends more and more to demagogical forms.

Kierkegaard

describes this period as one in which "the human race will become
an ocean where it will be impossible to distinguish between the
hordes of infusoria who previously formed isolated existences."

46

15
In this age of mass association, there is an elimination or submergence of "the individual" as an ethical category.
TI1e "people" or the "folk" have always served as "the dialectical factor in the development of the human race," asserts
Kierkegaard; they have been a group constantly manipulated by
various interests to "demolish kings and emperors . . . nobility and
clergy."

47

Finally, however, "the people" shows itself to be a

monstrous category in its own right which in turn is itself destroyed.

In the "last and final development, the concept 'the

people' itself becomes dialectical.
must be demolished."

48

It is now the people which

The destruction of this entity is the fourth

and final world-historical stage, the age of the single individual
in community, which comes about as a result of the leveling process
which destroys individuality, responsibility, and all positive
social bonds.
Kierkegaard, after chronicling his grim predictions regarding the prospects of leveling, claims that this process will in
turn yield to a new force, that of the single individual.

Leveling

serves to help the individual to attain "an essentially religious
attitude"; it is "the starting point for the highest life," one of
ethical seriousness, community, and neighbor love.

49

In this

coming period, the "individuals who relate to each other in the
relation are individually superior to the relation."

50

As a result of leveling, individuals can once again become
persons "in the complete equalitarian sense" with all the social

16
.
.
. .
imp 1 1cat1ons
t h at true equa 1"1tar1an1sm

.

conta~ns.

51

Community is

attained as ''the individual is primarily related to God and then
.

to t h e commun1ty.

,,52

In this period, "social life must again

play its role to the utmost degree," one in which political and
religious communi ties "must return richer and fuller with all the
content that the residual diversity of individuality can give the
1"d

ea. "53

A community of individuals is formed in this stage by the

action of conscience and divine spirit as the individual learns to
dominate himself rather than dominate others.

54

Kierkegaard has thus delineated the four major world-historical stages of European history:

the dialectic of antiquity, the

dialectic of Christendom (or of representation), the dialectic of
the present age, and the age of the individual in community.

As

these stages are akin to the developmental stages of an individual
person,

55

in the stages of Kierkegaard's own personal intellectual

development regarding society can be seen parallels as to these
historical stages.
To examine this contention, we may think of the four worldhistorical stages as two major eras, each with two stages.
era is

o~iented

The first

toward the established order and social harmony and

the second is oriented away from this previous condition and toward
something new.

The first era consists of the dialectic of antiquity

and the dialectic of representation; both are monarchial, oriented
toward orderly social life in which the king rules either as a
qualitative superior or as a divinely constituted representativ.e.

17
The dialectics of the present age and of the age of the individual
in community comprise the second major era and are similar in that
they represent a move away from the established social and political
order and toward a new and different structuring of social relationships and political authority.

The leveling which is characteristic

of the present age is clearly in opposition to the established
order, not only politically but also socially and religiously.

In

demolishing the existing order, however, the present age betrays
itself into the hands of the new age of the individual in community.
The examination of Kierkegaard's life and writings to
follow in this study will show that he personally underwent two
major periods, which like the world-historical periods, represent
respectively an establishment-oriented and a progressive orientation.

In the first major era of his own thinking, 1830-1846, Kier-

kegaard maintained monarchist, state-supporting convictions.

The

first stage of that era covers the student period of 1830-1839.
His monarchial orientation and other affinities with the first stage
of the first world-historical era are evidenced in his 1841 dissertation The Concept of Irony, especially in his criticism of Socrates
for failing to regard the state highly enough as the sole ground of
true virtue. 56

Also expressing this orientation are his conserva-

tive newspaper articles, his proroyalist student activities, and
his expressed views that the king represents an intensified stateconsciousness,57 as well as his maintenance of a view similar to the
Greek ideal of the polis and his attacks on liberalism in his

18
.
1 s. 58
JOUrna

The second monarchial stage can be said to extend from 1839
until 1846.

Here Kierkegaard is more inclined to speak of the king

as having his authority delegated by God, not his by virtue of
. 59 to 1nt1mate
. .
.
d anger of t h e crow d , 60 an d to
mer1t,
t h e com1ng

express a high view of representative government, one in which
officials and subjects take their respective responsibilities
seriously to make for harmonious social relationships.
The ideals of this second monarchial stage persist in the
second major era, 1846-1855, now serving as a foil to display the
characteristic reigning faults of the age.

Kierkegaard is now

increasingly pessimistic about the willingness of existing European
society to submit to self-reform.

This second era is notable for

Kierkegaard's critique of social movements that have defected from
the ideals of what we have called the second monarchial stage.

This

second era is marked by the Corsair incident and the publication of
Works of Love and several edifying works, numerous journal entries,
and the critical treatment of the times in The Present Age.

In the

first stage of this second era, he discusses the mounting evidence
of social decay and political folly; in the second stage, he foresees
the coming of an age of community.
~~ereas

expressions of the ideal of community can be found

as early as 1836,

61

this second stage of the second era is distin-

guished in that the community ideal comes to be viewed as a genuine
alternative form of social organization to the now-decadent ideals of

19

the monarchial era.

Whereas previously he had spoken of community

both as an ideal and as a coming sociopolitical stage, 62 in this
fourth stage Kierkegaard more clearly conceptualizes community as
the outcome of social forces already at work, namely, leveling. 63
The hallmark of the second stage of this anti-establishment
era, then, is the vision of a new social situation predicated on the
realization of true individuality, genuine equality, and social
cooperation.

The intimations of the sort of society liberated

individuals can create are to be found both in the otherwise pessimistic Present Age and in·works of Love.

Of Works of Love, Edna

Hong and Howard Hong have said "that which makes it Christian
ethics is

.

its being ultimately the mature indicative ethics

of Christianity rooted in and motivated by the love of God for men,
for a man, for every man."

64

The socially significant love of which

Kierkegaard speaks empties social and economic distinctions of their
. . f.1cance, 65 vanqu1s
. h es t h e corros1ve
.
s1gn1
envy o f t h e " present
age,"

66

and seeks the good of others in practical ways.

67

The distinction between the two stages of this second era of
Kierkegaard's thought must be thought of primarily as conceptual
rather than as chronologi"cal.

The first stage is distinguished by

negative criticism and the second by a positive orientation toward
a new type of society.

Although the age of community period of

Kierkegaard's thought follows conceptually from the negative critique
rather than chronologically, there nonetheless can be noticed,
beginning in the pivotal 1848, a greater emphasis on the individual
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.
an d equa 1 ~ty

68

. f or t h e
an d d espa~r

expressed in the journal entry:

.

.

or der,

ex~st~ng

69

perh aps b est

''One solitary man cannot help or

save an age, he can only express that it is foundering." 70
Four stages of Kierkegaard's own development can thus be
seen in his social and political thinking, and these stages appear
to correspond to the stages of the world-historical process, much
as those stages of developmental processes were supposed to correspond to the development of an individual.

It now remains to be seen

just how Kierkegaard's thought in these periods comes to terms with
social and political concerns.
THE DIALECTIC OF

fu~TIQUITY:

KIERKEGAARD'S ROYALISM, 1830-1839
In Kierkegaard's earlier thinking can be seen a monarchial
conservatism based on an organic, Greek notion of society and the
state.

Kierkegaard in this period accepts what he takes to be the

Hegelian view of the state as the embodiment and the necessary
condition of all human virtues, as well as rights.

In his disser-

tation, The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard concurs with what he takes
to be Hegel's assessment of Socrates in viewing the primary significance of Socrates in his seeking to identify the rights of individuals solely in the context of the larger state.

Kierkegaard also

agreed that Socrates had rightly shown that true virtue is manifest
only in that context. 71

The early Kierkegaard faulted Socrates,

however, for seeing people primarily as individuals rather than as
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members of a political totality.

72

In the dissertation Kierkegaard

expressed a Hegelian and Greek-inspired political philosophy in
which the individual is seen as secondary in moral significance to
the state.

Although in his own time Kierkegaard believed that the

proper significance of the state was not fully realized, a Hellenic
ideal tantalized him so much that he could say in the Journals (1836)
that "when the state acquires its proper significance, to be exiled
will become--as it was with the Greeks--the most severe punishment."

73

Kierkegaard valued Hegel's notion of historical continuity
between social developments exhibiting a normal and stable social
evolution, as opposed to the rash and revolutionary spirit that had
been visible in France and even, in only incipiently, in placid
Denmark.
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Kierkegaard viewed the social evolution which leads to

"monarchy as (achieving) the intrinsically highest, as that to which
every other form of the state strives."

75

Divine governance controls

and conditions the development of history to such a point that the
king might use the traditional plural "we" not merely as a convention, but as signifying an actual plurality, since within the
monarchy resides the "intensified state-consciousness."

76

The king's

authority is seen to reside both in his human distinctiveness and in
his personal embodiment of an historically evolved, advanced, and

.
77
organ1c state.
In the years 1846-1867, the king of Denmark, Christian VIII,
was yet an absolute monarch.

Long interested in Kierkegaard, he had

appreciated the writer's help in dissolving an antiroyalist
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.
78
demonstration while he was a student.

In 1835, Kierkegaard had

been involved in a student meeting which had threatened to decide
an issue against the conservative position.

By adjourning the

meeting, Kierkegaard effectively averted what he considered an
0
0 1 1nc1
0 0d ent. 79
un d es1ra b 1e po 101t1ca
Although frequently to be faulted for his lack of interest
in public affairs even in his own day, Kierkegaard also published
three strongly conservative political articles in the Flying Post in
the 1835-1836 period.

80

King Christian admired Kierkegaard's acuity in discerning the
Danish mind, and found his independence and humor both admirable and
intriguing.
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Strongly desiring to be Kierkegaard's literary

patron, he was rebuffed by Kierkegaard, who cited two reasons.

First,

his lack of desire to sacrifice his financial independence owing to
his substantial inheritance from his father, a wealthy merchant.
Second, he felt that he must reserve his ultimate allegiance for
God alone, notwithstanding his political loyalty and strong conservatism.82

Kierkegaard at this time, and despite his royalism,

nevertheless recognized that political and religious allegiances
could be at variance, even in a "Christian" nation that appeared to
be both religiously and politically secure.
Kierkegaard's strong conservatism is evidenced clearly in
the virulent antiliberal remarks made in his Journals.

He wittily

observed in 1837 that "hatred of monarchist principles has gone so
far in our day that people want to have four-part solo parts."

83
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This indicates that a romantic individualism had arisen in the ranks
of the politically liberal populace, so that no longer could they
view themselves "merely" as members of the body politic and subordinate to a king, but rather they wished to picture themselves as
meriting far greater autonomy.
In 1838, Kierkegaard attacked the liberal, antiroyalist
politicians of his day for their lack of historical sense and
respect for continuity which, he charged, led them to recognize only
two of the "three marks of the validity of the public spirit, consensus and universalitas, . . . but (to) completely overlook the third-antiquitas."84

He derided them for their lack of individual integ-

rity and for their propensity to assemble to reinforce one another's
negative qualities.
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Their baneful ubiquity in public life exer-

cises "a certain vigilance and watchfulness over everything," being
86
.
everywh ere ' 'l ~.k e b a d penn1.es."

He had received their notice as

well; they had charged him with continually contradicting the
received political wisdom.

However, he believed that they had by

far outdone him on that score, by virtue of their constant engage.
ment 1.n

1£

~-contra

87
d.l.CtJ.on;
.
•
•
h out a b ac k constant 1 y ta 11K~ng
Wl.t

ground of knowledge about their subject, they resembled, he
remarked, "the tongue in a church bell."

88

It is generally conceded that Kierkegaard was conservative,

especially in this early period, but it is important to discern the
exact nature and background of the views which have earned him this
designation.

Hermann Diem rightly observes that Kierkegaard's

24

conservatism was a position of the conservation of the moral law
upon which the very nature of civilization rests.

89

Although

Kierkegaard was "conservative" to the end, he long realized the
fact that in the contemporary social and political environment,
conditions had become untenable and in need of redress. 90

Writing

in the Flying Post articles of 1835-1836, however, he saw Denmark
flirting with the revolutionary ideas which had culminated in the
French Revolution.

He was intractably set against the cross-cul-

tural importation of foreign political ideas, maintaining that
social reform movements would predictably lead to catastrophe if
they were to follow abstract ideas without regard to the concrete
realities of the traditions and constitutions of a country.

In his

views he followed the social philosophy of Burke, a philosophy that
he held to substantially, although adapting it to his own purposes
.

f or t h e rest of h 1s career.

91

These Kierkegaardian views would

persevere in his social thinking life a "subterranean stream,"
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reappearing, for example, in The Present Age, in which according to
Walter Lowrie, "all the trends of his thinking find their ultimate
"93
.
an d most a d equate expressiOn.

In place of mob rule and the unthinking, overhasty application of foreign political philosophies to the Danish situation,
Kierkegaard emphasized the importance of national custom and of
the place of the individual.

However, as Lowrie notes, Kierke-

gaard's individualism is not a selfish concern for the individual
•
• •
wit h d isregar d f or t h e rest o f soc1ety;
1t
1s not

II

•
1194
romant1c.
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Rather than suport such an egotism, Kierkegaard's view sees the true
individual as socially responsible, and this shall be the basis of
. 1 t h ough t. 95
. more pos1.t.1ve soc1a
h 1s

Ne1t
. h er was K.1erk egaar d' s

1

conservatism a class egotism, for although he identified himself
as an aristocrat, he carne more and more to fault this class for
shirking the responsibility which carne with their privilege.
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Also, as we have noted, he could not ignore the serious social and
97
political problems festering in conservative, placid Denmark.
THE DIALECTIC OF CHRISTENDOM:
KIERKEGA~RD'S

REPRESENTATIVE VIEW, 1839-1846

Corresponding to the period designated the dialectic of
Christendom (representation) is a stage of thought which upholds
the ideals of this stage as those of a highly developed state of
society.

Although he would later develop beyond his allegiance to

this high value placed on secular authority, it was only because he
saw this admirable stage as losing its hold, being dissolved by a
new spirit of the age, and because he could see a yet higher form
of social life beginning to appear.

The ideals of the age of

representation belonged to a noble, if doomed, stage of European
development based on an elevated view of humanity.
In the age of representation at its height can be seen
Kierkegaard's view of the state, in which individuals and institutions support each other in a mutually beneficial, harmonious
relationship.

The social relationshiponwhich political society

26

was based was the voluntary submission of individuals to their
representative, whom they saw as qualitatively their equal under
God (a view resulting from the Christianizing of Europe), but yet
superior in the eminence and distinction due him by virtue of his
.
98
off 1.ce.
Kierkegaard strictly held the line between religion and
politics, and reserved for political life its proper purview in
which it enjoys authority "with respect to everything secular,
including art, scholarship, and science."

99

Kierkegaard recognized

a "remarkable connection" between Protestantism and "the modern
political point of view," as they both represent struggles for
popular, decentralized sovereignty.

100

This similarity between

religious and social trends indicates a causal relation between
these movements.

Kierkegaard also came to maintain that the cen-

trality of the political life of the Greek polis as the proper
sphere for the full exercise of human capacities had given way in
Christendom to the centrality of the religious life for that
purpose.

101

Diem has noted that K. E. Logstrup contended that
Kierkegaard denied the divine basis for the authority of th2
state and that Kierkegaard granted the state no underived author1..

ty w.h"1.ch
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b e 1ong to ].. t J.ntr1.ns1.ca
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While this charge

contains truth, it misses the point of Kierkegaard's view on
authority.

For Kierkegaard, the question of the metaphysics of

authority lvas not central; he was far less concerned with theories

27

about the origin of the state's authority, so

pop~lar

philosophers, than he was with its responsible use.

103

among many
Kierke-

gaard believed that the king had genuine, but derivative, authority.
Kierkegaard's thought does not recognize any unchallengeable, absolute political authority.

On his view, political authority is

derived from divine authority, but is not delegated to the extent
envisioned in classical divine right monarchialism, in which it is
a divinely granted and absolute right.

On the contrary, political

authority is challengeable, but only by taking utmost responsibility
before God Himself.

104

The king's authority, while plausibly described as absolute, is absolutely derivative.

To regard a king as having

authority involves having the "accent fall qualitatively on the
authority," and not on the personal characteristics of the king.
For this reason, it is positively detrimental to authority for the
king to be clever, artistic, or otherwise to be distinguished for
his personal qualities.

lOS

His authority comes "from elsewhere,"

and empowers a merely human, perhaps indifferent individual.

106

Authority, then, does not belong properly to the king or other
officials, but is rather a "passing factor" which is theirs as
they serve a certain political function in the life of the state.

107

No longer is authority seen to derive from the king's being an
"intensified state consciousness."
In the period of representation there is an authority that
does not derive merely "from the consent of the governed," but which
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is delegated by God to the existing regime.

Proper social life is

one in which individuals see themselves related in submission to
the rule of authorities, not because of the latter's special human
characteristics, but because of their authority proper.

Obedience

is the proper response to such authority, while those occupying
such positions of authority must realize that they are to act consistently with the realization that their authority derives strictly
from their social and political role, and not from themselves.

108

Kierkegaard believed that he had inadvertantly played a
part in causing social change in the very publication of his
aesthetic works.

Viewing himself as an aristocrat, he believed

himself to have brought criticism to his own class with his urbane
and apparently frivolous aesthetic works, thus contributing "to
the movement which was impairing power and reknown in general,"

109

although he was quick to claim that he had been "always conservative" with respect to "paying to the eminent and distinguished the
deference, awe, and achniration due to them . .,llO

He believed that

the aristocracy, as an elite ruling class, was owed this admiration
and deference as their due.

Significantly, this is clearly related

to their responsibility in the use of authority, which they have
proved too cowardly to bring to bear on the crises which were
beginning to face Denmark.
Kierkegaard's political position at this time could be
accurately described as an Augustinian dual-citizenship role.
saw himself at once to be a political subject under a divinely

He
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derived political authority, and more essentially as a citiz.en of
h eaven wh o owe d a greater a 11 eg1ance t h ere. 111
0

Nonetheless, in sum,

he took seriously the authority of the rulers; "authority is the
decisive quality" that marks the declaration of the king against
that of the most talented individual.

112

The king's command, by

virtue of its authority, is not to be judged or challenged by
or d1nary h uman stan dar ds o f cr1t1c1sm. 113
0

o

o

o

Kierkegaard's divinely

sanctioned monarchy must be seen in context with his insistence on
the absolute equality of the king and the citizen qua men; there
is no superiority in the king as a person.

114

This view has the

merit of dismissing a conservative notion that the kind of
authority the king has is based on his superiority to other men
from a qualitative standpoint while granting him decisive authority.
The two stages of Kierkegaard's monarchial era, as we have
called it, both flourish before the Corsair incident and

e~~ibit

continuity with regard to basing the relation of the individual to
the state on fundamental social relations, themselves depending on
a proper religious relationship and intellectual orientation.
Even his later, post-Corsair views indicate that he holds this
earlier strain of thought as an ideal, from which Europe lamentably
is seen to be turning.

He views the dialectic of the present age,

the inevitable leveling process in which individual characteristics
are driven out of society, as making social life impossible, and
yet, almost paradoxically, as leading to an age of community in
which these early emphases will again have preeminence.
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It is important to notice at the outset of this discussion
that Kierkegaard was indeed concerned greatly for the social and
political welfare of society throughout his career, 115 and we must
agree with Herbert Marcuse that a deep-rooted social theory is
present throughout Kierkegaard's literary corpus. 116

This theory,

or social philosophy as Werner Stark has called it, "underlies Kierkegaard's aesthetic and edifying works

. . it is there and it is

definite as a subterreanean stream" of social thought.

117

Recog-

nizing the presence of a definite social theory throughout Kierkegaard's works enables one to find continuity in his thinking, even
in the seemingly contradictory antisocial pronouncements of the
post-Corsair period.
It is generally recognized that a conservative spirit
dominates Kierkegaard's social and political pronouncements, the
conservatism which we have found in his early journalistic efforts
and which rests on his recognition of the tendency of the demos
to become a fearsome mob, in which the crucial quality of individual responsibility becomes lost.
resident in the "public."

118

There is a threat to personhood

Kierkegaard's position does not

selfishly regard the individual as separated from and placed above
the rest of society; Kierkegaard's individual, as has been noted,
.
lS

. 11 y respons1"bl e. 119
soc1a

This social responsibility is

expressed in among other things, political and social fellm•ship.
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\vhen Kierkegaard claims that his entire authorship e.xhibi ts
continuity by being characterized by religious concerns,

121

this
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must be viewed in connection with such social concerns, the danger
of the crowd, and the crucial notion of neighbor love, which is the
essential ingredient in his social thought's positive aspect.

It

must also be seen in context with religiously derived authority
.

an d vo 1untary ob e dlence.

122

There does exist, however, a definite and significant break
in continuity between his early, Greek notion of the state derived
from his Hegelian training and the views corresponding to the age
of Christendom and beyond.

Popular philosophy emphasized the uni-

versal rather than the particular, and had attempted to show that
man's true essence is realized only as he is immersed in the universal, whether it be state, social and economic class, humanity in
1?3

general, or the Absolute. -

Obedience to authority thus had become

the result of people's own reflective judgment that the authority
has superior qualities entitling it to obedience.

124

The antihegelian movement which marks the bulk of Kierkegaard's philosophy parallels his growing opposition to his own
early, self-styled Hegelian view of man in society.

In an 1847

writing, Kierkegaard faults Hegel for doing away with obedience
and authority by making them contingent on distinctively human
. .
125
qua 1 l tles.

Kierkegaard also breaks with what he takes to be

Hegel's representation of huinan essence as "the race," because this
is now seen to be ''a misunderstanding" and a "new paganism. n

It

is however a paganism directed away from Christianity, rather than
towards it, as the earlier Hellenic and Roman paganisms had been.
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Kierkegaard had come to believe that every individual is more than
the race, and that to relate oneself to God is greater than to relate
oneself to the crowd, because the highest self-actualization of the
individual is in his relationship to God rather than to a universal,
.
126
wh et h er race or Ab so 1ute or soc1ety.
As a result of social changes taking place in the 1845-1846
period, appropriately brought into personal focus in the Corsair
incident,

Kierkegaard began to write under his own name in the

role of a social prophet.
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He mentions in his Journals that his

"description of the future" which appeared in the 1846 Present Age
was "quickly and exactly . . . fulfilled two years later in 1848,"
although at the time of its writing, "everyone believed that everything was secure, that both 'the system' and the states were just
. h t of per f ect1on.
.
"128
a bout at t h e h e1g
In 1848 Kierkegaard recorded in his Journals that God was
maturing him for "something higher," and declared that
if I go on living, and even if I have but one hour to live-r will use it to the best of my ability for that for which I
have up to now used it--to work against the stronghold of evil
--the crowd, the unholy blather between man and man, the
unholy contempt for being an individual human being.l29
In this remark we can see Kierkegaard outlining his project for the
rest of his career on the basis of what had gone before, enabling
us to see the continuity between his earlier works and the puzzling
strident attacks pitting the individual against the crowd which
marks his later work.

Anything but surprised by the seemingly

abrupt social and political development which startled peaceful
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Denmark in 1848, he was rather quite well prepared for such developments with his already established doctrine of the individual singled
out by the God-relationship, on which legitimate political authority
must rest, as well as >vi th his philosophical analyses of the crowd
and of the breakdown of authority.
The era marked by the dialectic of the present age might also
be called the "age of dissolution."

In this period, the moral and

political life of Europe had begun to disintegrate "due to the
abandonment or the distortion of central Christian truths. "
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Very

early, in 1838, he had begun to discern the signs of this development in the work From the Papers-of One Still Living, lending eredence to his claim he made for himself that he was entitled to be
thought of as a "prophet" in the predictive sense as well as in the
131
.
.
.
sense of b e1ng
t h e d e 1"1verer of d"1v1ne
mora 1 warn1ng.

Kierke-

gaard believed that he had been given this role, which became more
.
prom1nent
a f ter t h e

corsa1r
. 1nc1
. . d ent. 132

The year 1848 was pivotal in the development of Kierkegaard's
social and political thought.

In that year, the "shrill note of

chaos" was heard; major political and social changes took place
that shook even complacent Denmark with its "market-town mentality."
As summarized by Walter Kaufmann,
in 1848 a revolution in France overthrows the monarchy and
establishes a republic, while revolutions also sweep Germany
and Austria and Italy; Denmark annexes Schleswig-Holstein . .
a revolt flares up in Hungary, wars sweep through Italy,
Prussian and Austrian troops expel the Danes from SchleswigHolstein, the Communists in Paris rise against the new
republic and are beaten down in bloody street fights, the
emperor has to flee Vienna, more bloody revolts are fought
--,~· ..~ ,.......... ""
:i~ ··~:
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out in Paris, the emperor of Austria is forced to abdicate in
favor of his nephew--all in 1848.133
Kierkegaard had long been discerning the spirit of the age.
We have already noticed his farsighted predictions in the 1846
work, The Present Age, and how he saw them fulfilled two years
later, when most of Europe was taken by surprise by the developments.
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His remarkable attention and discernment is evidenced by

his noting in an 1846 Journal entry that at the time, "everyone
(had) believed that everything was secure."

145

Again, in 1847,

Kierkegaard noted that "the dialectic of monarchy is in the worldhistorical sense both practiced and established," and that "now we
are in the process of beginning somewhere else, that is, with the
intensive internal growth of the state.
the present age.)
ua 1 . 111136

(That is, the dialectic of

Then comes the category 'the single individ-

(Parentheses added.)

Kierkegaard believed that this

historical theorizing was validated by the European bread riots then
taking place, which, Kierkegaard maintained, served to demonstrate
"how exactly I have understood the age."
Kierkegaard believed that the office of the prophet was
ordained by Providence to discern the age in order to help preserve
the very possibility of social and political life:

"Now in 1848 and

afterward it is very clear that if Providence is going to send prophets and judges in the future it must simply be to help the govern137
.
.
ment, to ass1st
so t h at t,h ere may b e govern1ng
at a 11 . n

Kierkegaard believed that the prophet could be of service
in assisting to maintain the social bonds which are the foundation
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of the possibility of political life.

In an age such as his, when

the "significance of the 1848 catastrophe
dropped out,"

138

. . explains why eternity

the role of the prophet is to call people away from

their headlong rush into secular solutions and their denial of the
roles of both God and of the individual, while appealing to what
could be accomplished by mass action.
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In spite of this aspect of his prophetic role, in 1849
Kierkegaard remarked that "one solitary man cannot help or save an
age; he can only express that it is foundering."

140

This view

accords with his developing view that the social process taking
place in the age of dissolution is inevitable though terrible, and
that even the fact of the masses turning away from "eternity" is
providential in a larger, world-historical sense.
Gates has pointed out that Kierkegaard accurately foresaw
three great changes in society which would be brought about in the
age of dissolution on the intellectual level.

In education, there

would be an impersonal, pragmatic, and scientific emphasis which
would neglect the realms of meaning and value.

There would be,

secondly, a preoccupation with detached theorizing and reflection,
an intellectualism which would lead to the abandonment of creative
enthusiasm and action.

In addition, there would be the development

of the abstract "mass man," engendered by humanity's fascination
with association and with the numerical, and this would exclude the
. d"1v1. dua 1 . 141
rea 1 man as respons1. bl e 1n

Foreseeing these great but

sabtle changes, Kierkegaard deter:nined to "work against the
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stronghold of evi1"

142

and to continue his lifelong struggle

"against every tyranny, including that of the numerical," which
he saw as his religious duty and prophetic role.

143

Kierkegaard saw the advancing, negative social and political changes of his day as occasioned by "the advance of civilization, the rise of large cities, centralization, and what corresponds to all this and essentially produced it--the press as a means
of communication
direction.

~hich

has] given all life a completely wrong

Personal existence vanished."

144

(Parentheses added.)

Sociological forces at work for some time in Europe were bringing
about an environment which in conjunction with the decline of
essential religious truths about man were to usher in a calamitous
age.

The question of reform was now being pursued in an entirely

wrong manner, since "all reforming, insofar as there was any, now
.
.
too k a one-s1.d e d d.1rect1on
aga1nst
t h e government. "145

Kierkegaard

was aware of the need for political and governmental reform, but
far more fundamental in his eyes was that reform be carried out
"according to a proper standard," and that the reform would first
direct itself against the crowd; this is "the genuine idea of what
. means to re f arm. "146
1t

Instead, the crowd with the aid of the

press "reformed" the government in the peaceful but mob-induced
political changes which brought Denmark to constitutional monarchy.
Thus, Kierkegaard's thought was clearly responsive to the
social and political dissolution he saw around him, as he fought
at first to correct these changes, and then later to continue to
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discern them in hopes of being instrumental in ushering in a
future world-historical stage, the category of the single
individual.

CHAPTER III
THE CORSAIR INCIDENT
Kierkegaard's phase of social thought which corresponds to
the world-historical dialectic of the present age was ushered in
by the lampoonings of a frivolous but vicious satirical journal,
the Corsair.

The Corsair had for a few years been·satirizing the

king, public officials, and others in the public eye under the
secret direction of Kierkegaard's old friend from student days,
the aesthetician P. K. !v!¢1ler.

M¢1ler, who aspired to the chair

of aesthetics at Copenhagen, shared the operation of the Corsair
with Goldschmidt, a gifted writer of fiction.
The absence of Kierkegaard's name from the derisive pages
of the Corsair was conspicuous in view of his prominence in Danish
literature and philosophy.

Both

~1¢1ler

and Goldschmidt held him

in high regard for his aesthetic works, praising him in the Corsair
under his pseudonyms.
Kierkegaard was upset by what he viewed as shameful immorality in the Corsair's constant villification of public figures, a
position he shared with the genteel public at large.
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He was also

opposed to its liberalism and objected to being praised by so disreputable a journal.

He publicly identified the hitherto anonymous

M¢1ler as being behind the Corsair, thereby blocking M¢1ler' s
academic ambitions.

M¢ller subsequently left Denmark in dejection
38
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for France, but Goldschmidt turned the journal against Kierkegaard
in a prolonged series of attacks here described by Peter Rohde:
Instead of publishing any written attack on him, Goldschmidt
let his caricaturist, Klaestrup, take charge of the matter,
and the latter, in the months that followed, week after week
let his somewhat primitive draughtsmanship satirize Kierkegaard's rather easily recognizable peculiarities: his
slightly deformed body, sharp-pointed profile, and comically
asymetrical trousers, of which--due probably to the physical
disproportion--one leg was always shorter than the other, and
in addition, the umbrella he always carried, his top-hat and
tight-fitting frock-coat. Kierkegaard was portrayed in all
kinds of ridiculous situations: having fights with various
(named) public figures; inspecting his (somewhat disabled)
troops; presenting his books to people as gifts (because no
one would buy them); even as 'training his girl-friend' (by
riding piggy back on her shoulders). It is hardly surprising
that Kierkegaard, in a period where such caricatures were a
novelty, was upset.l48
Kierkegaard referred to the personal abuse that he received
as his being "trampled to death by geese," as he subsequently
became an object of public derision on the streets.
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Nonetheless,

Kierkegaard's political thought was stimulated by the abuse, which
gave him the vision of making clear the true nature of Christianity
and its relevance for the social and political institutions which
.
.
150
h e saw as d angerous 1y s 1 1pp1ng.

Kierkegaard came through this incident to realize his
difference from other people, to gain a new appreciation of the
importance of the status of the individual, and to dedicate himself
all the more to religiously based writing on social concerns.

He

claimed the incident gave a "new string" to his ''bow," a deepened
faith, a deeper tone, and a broader compass of concern.
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He

came to identify the baneful influence of the press as contributing

40

to the demoralization of society.

In opposing anonymous writers as

representatives of public opinion, he attacked the great irresponSl. b.1 1"1ty 0 f

.
1"lS t.lC wr1t1ng.
. .
JOUrna
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The Corsair incident did more than torment Kierkegaard; it
enabled him to see more clearly than ever before the workings of the
dialectic of social decay in the present age.

Irresponsible jour-

nalism lowers the publicly· acceptable standards of mutual respect
of persons for one another, and this destroys respect for political
authority, eroding the social bonds upon which political society
must rest, and thereby leading to further social degeneration.
The malignant work of the press aids and is aided by the
phenomenon of i'envy," which expresses itself through the press in
tearing down those persons who enjoy personal, political, or social
eminence.

Kierkegaard was convinced that the personal abuses he

suffered came to him because of his commitment to "the dangerous
business" of "witnessing against demoralization," that is, of
opposing journalistic assaults on innocent people and ultimately
on society itself.

While the irresponsible press as represented

in the Corsair received outward condemnation from polite society,
the public inwardly rejoiced in the gratification of their envious
lust.
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Kierkegaard attempted to retain his equanimity in the midst
of the abuse he received:
if someone is going to be a persona publica these days, then
taking exception to being overwhelmed occasionally with abusive
language is like taking exception to . . . what it means for
an officer in the fire brigade to be splashed . . . the spray
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gets on his coat . . . no closer than that.
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Nonetheless, Kierkegaard regarded the daily press with moral contempt admixed with social and religious concern.

The press is

"cowardly secular-mindedness," eroding the religious basis of
social organization and wrongly directing attacks on the goven1ment,
failing to admit that with the change of world-historical categories
it is now the crowd in the position of tyrant which should be
challenged.
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Kierkegaard believed that like himself as an indi-

vidual, the "whole of public life" was "feverishly tossed about"
by the press.

156

Journalists incite social unrest by inspiring the

lower social classes to irresponsible rage and by otherwise causing
. t ere 1ass b.1tterness. 15 7
mutua 1 1n

Journalism contributes to the demoralization of public lite
in the age of leveling by "intellectually-spiritually buttering up
the middle class" as bread and circuses "buttered up" Rome's
masses.

158

The public is a "hungry monster" which "hungers with a

desparate passion 'to get something to chatter about.'

The journal-

ists are animal keepers who provide something for the public to talk
about . . . the public devours someone tastefully prepared by the
J. ourna 1'1s ts. "159

The press exists to provide the public's requirement for
empty and aimless, but vicious, chatter.

Chatter is a perversion

of God's gift of speech to man, which was intended to be used to
"talk, each man with his neighbor, the lover with the beloved,
friend with friend, also several men with each other. ,,1 60

However,
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as Kenneth Hamilton has remarked,
[Kierkegaard] concluded that the press existed to stimulate
the negative passions (envy in leading place) that prevented
people from becoming individuals. Without inwardness and
passion, men's minds were occupied with talkativeness, gossip,
formlessness, superficiality, flirtation, and reasoning (as
opposed to dialectic).l61
Kierkegaard said that the public lusts for "self-pollution by
talking . . . which it indulges with the help of the journalist
. . . chattering about our meaningless lives, particularly the
. . 1.1t1es
.
tr1v1a
of our 1.1ves. ,.162

This desire for chatter which the

press satisfies is both a cause and an effect of the press.
kegaard's own relation to this phenomenon is unequivocal:

Kier"

. . if

I have but one hour to live . . . I will use it . . . to work against
the stronghold of evil . . . [including] the unholy blather between
man and man."
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In this context can be appreciated the seriously

intended jest that "if I were a father and had a daughter who was
seduced, I would by no means abandon her; but a son who became a
journalist I would regard as lost."
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Significantly, it is not only the vicious content of journalistic writing but also the form that serves the demoralization
process.

Journalism as a whole is a "corrupting sophism, 11 and far

more fundamental than the occasional error in the newspaper is the
basic falseness of this "whole basic form of communication."
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Because "almost everything is communicated by the press," impersonality permeates public life, resulting in the creation of the
crowd.

166

The crowd is at least partly a creature of the impersonal

nature of the form of the mass print medium.

The various
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technologies which had made such things as the mass print medium
possible have all had the same result; "all of mankind's great
inventions (railroads, telegraph, etc.)" and "the speed of the
printing press"
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tend toward demoralization.

The format of the daily press, playing on the public, contributes to demoralization in that an anonymous author can speak
as an authority about intellectual, moral, and religious matters,
getting thousands to mimic him, while never having to take responsiblity for his own opinions.

The disregarding of proper authority

by the press is directly causally responsible for the emergence of
mass men who claim the right to be able to judge truth as though
they were experts, eroding the basis of government in proper social
.
h.1ps. 168
re 1 atJ.ons

The newspaper, in its mode of communication, does

not consider the nature of the subject it is communicating; whether
it be politics or criticism, it "presumes that it is the many, the
. .
. 1n
. f orme d . "169
maJOrJ.ty
t h at J.S

Kierkegaard seriously believed that the press is "deeply
implicated" in the demoralization of public life by disregarding
distinctions between the knowledgeable and the competent, on the
one hand, and the ignorant and the meddlesome, on the other. "
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Perhaps the most significant lesson Kierkegaard gained
from the Corsair incident was that because of the press, men no
.
1 aut h or1ty.
.
171
longer have a sense of proper po 1 J.tica

The disrup-

tion of public life by the press makes government virtually impossible, founded as it is on the notion that in politics, "there are
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a few individuals who are more insightful than others and for that
very reason are able to see so much farther that they are able to
pl.'1 0 t . "172

Kierkegaard maintained that "whatever the subject or

sphere, it is the minority, the very few, some few individuals who
,,173
.
k now; t h e many are 1.gnoran t.

The daily operation of government

would best be left to those who have made it their business to
acquire the skills of the craft.

There is to be a rational division

of labor based on the recognition that "every one of us has his own
subject"; unless that were true, Kierkegaard maintains, "one would
h ave to- cone 1u d e t h at. every man knows everyth'1ng. 1!174

Government

depends on individuals who due to their experience, training, skill,
and sensitivity are able to discharge their responsibilities as
experts in governing.

This activity lies beyond the competence of

the many, the illusions of the press notwithstanding.
No less of course does government depend on obedient subjects.

The relationship of governor to governed is rooted in the

religiously based concept of respect for those in authority.

The

press virulently dissolves this relation, secure in its notion that
"everybody should

1

govern.

1
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"

Kierkegaard suggested that the

press has surreptitiously suppressed its motives, that "the press
really wanted to dispose of
govern."

1

government 1 --and then it would itself
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The daily press changes public life, making it "basically
untruth," a far more serious crime against society than theft.
Kierkegaard was not optimistic as are many who maintain that."the
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truth will out."

As he states, "we do not say that the truth can

overtake the lie and error" because "the truth is not so fast on
.
f eet. ,,177
1ts

Kierkegaard believes that such a position is naive

in that it ignores the psychological fact that the crowd would
rather accept the press' palatable lies than stern, unpalatable
truths, and once having done so, would prefer to remain in error
rather than admit to having been duped.
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Truth is at a genuine

disadvantage against untruth in the media in an age of leveling.
Truth, on the other hand, cannot effectively use the press because
of a basic "untruth" or distortiveness of the media as directed
towards great numbers of unknowledgeable people.

Truth's spokes-

man must be the single individual, who can in turn communicate
. 1 e 1n
. d.1v1. d ua 1 . 1 79
on 1 y to anot h er s1ng

CHAPTER IV
THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL DECAY IN THE
DIALECTIC OF THE PRESENT AGE
As the Corsair incident forcefully brought horne to Kierkegaard, his was an age of accelerating dissolution of the bonds of
respect and responsibility that bind people together in a wellordered society.

Central to the Kierkegaardian concept of social

order is the dual-sided notion of authority and responsibility.
Consequently, in a period of social decay, at the heart of this
development is the loss of responsibility on the part of the
governed classes complemented by the abdication of authority on
the part of the rulers.

Kierkegaard's writings show that in the

dialectic of social decay both of these undesirable tendencies are
operative in the social and political spheres.

Such a development,

though abhorrent to Kierkegaard and thoroughly in opposition to
his ideals, is nonetheless inevitable and unopposable, and ultimately bears within the seeds of a qualitatively higher social
situation.
Although it is difficult in the mutually reinforcing set of
social phenomena to find a beginning point, the dialectic of social
decay seems to begin with an intellectual development at the personal, "grassroots" level of individuals in society, which then
collectively leads to widespread social change.
46

Kierkegaard
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believed that the great coming social changes already underway in
his day had originated in a seemingly politically insignificant
intellectual phenomenon which he calls "reflection."

In The

Present Age, Kierkegaard characterizes the age of dissolution as
follows:

"Our age is essentially one of understanding and reflec-

tion, momentarily bursting into enthusiasm, and shrewdly lapsing
.
1nto
repose. "180

The intellectual characteristic of the age of dissolution is
that the situations of human life are seen as merely intellectual
problems.

The cognitive aspects of human existence come to pre-

dominate over all others in being brought into play not only in
traditionally intellectual concerns, but also in human interpersonal
problems in which the proper·response would not predominantly be
analysis and evaluation, but rather action and responsibility.
Kierkegaard illustrates the problem of reflection by means
of a parable of a pond on which is seen a valuable gem.

Skaters,

realizing the thinness of the ice, prJdently skate towards the gem
with great flourish as far as is deemed safe, and then retreat.
The decisive action of risking safety to retrieve the jewel is
called for, but the skaters prefer the onlookers' applause to any
real risk, and so they get only as near as they safely can.
Onlookers would fail to appreciate or understand an individual who
is willing to make a sincere, dangerous attempt to skate to the gem
where the ice is thinnest; true, venturesome action is scorned,
.
.
while reflective, prudent, merely apparent act1on
1s
applau d e d . 181
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As this parable shows, in the reflective age, daring and enthusiasm
are transformed into a feat of mere skill.

182

The overly reflective age of dissolution threatens all
authority relationships, beginning at the mundane, personal levels
of home and school.

In what must have seemed peevishness or at

least undue alarm in the situation in which he wrote, although a
quite understandable attitude today, Kierkegaard argued that overreflectiveness on the part of the child in the school and in the
home was a harbinger of the breakdown of social bonds.

The erosion

of authority relationships in education is seen in situations in
which
a disobedient youth is no longer in fear of his schoolmaster-the relation is rather one of indifference in which schoolmaster and pupil discuss how a good school should be run. To
go to school no longer means to be in fear of the master, or
merely to learn, but rather implies being interested in the
problem of education.l83
Whereas in the traditional authority relationship the child is in
school to obey and learn, the reflective child feels himself
entitled rather to evaluate the educational situation itself in
terms of his own intellectual

cri~eria.

Similar precociousness is

found in the home, where the "tension" also exists.

This tension

is not a "tension which strains the forces to the breaking point,
but rather a tension which exhausts life itself and the fire of
that enthusiasm and inwardness which makes the fetters of dependence
1"1gh t. "189
. .
an d t h e crown of d om1n1on

In the home, a tension exists in the relationship of father
and child:
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A father no longer curses his son in anger, using all his
parental authority, nor does a son defy his father, a conflict
which might end in the inwardness of forgiveness; on the contrary, their relationship is irreproachable, for it is really
in process of ceasing to exist, since they are no longer
related to one another in the relationship; in fact it has
become a problem in which the two partners observe each other
as in a game, instead of having any relation to each other, and
they note down each other's remarks instead of showing a firm
devotion.l85
This relationship between the authority figure and the
person who is to obey is characteristic of an age in which the
desire is not to do away with authority in its outward trappings,
but rather wishes to abolish it in its inward significance which is
based on the attitudes of both the governor and the governed.
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Unlike a revolutionary age in which authority is recognized, defied,
opposed,

and perhaps destroyed, in the age of reflection, "the

inward reality of relationships" is "cunningly emptied of significance," even as the outward forms are left to stand.
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In a reflective age, educational and familial bonds erode
while the outward forms are retained as empty shells.

188

The pro-

cess, however, does not cease after destroying everyday relationships, but proceeds to consume religious and political institutions.
In such a period, people "no more desire a powerful king than an
heroic liberator or religious authority."

189

Even the normative

authority of language is destroyed; chatter replaces true speech
in which genuine commitment is to be expressed; religion too falls
victim in that in religious contexts, reflection empties language
·
· ·f·1.cance w.h"l
·
· 1ogy untouched. 199
o f 1.ts
s1gn1
1 e 1 eav1.ng
t h e term1no
Similarly, on the political level, "no one wishes to do away with

50

the power of the king, but if little by little it could be transformed into something purely fictitious, everyone would be quite
prepared to cheer him." 191

This form of attack on political

authority is extremely complicated and subtle; "against a rebellion
one can use force," but in the reflective age are faced "dialectical
complications [which] are difficult to root out." 192
In the case of eminent individuals, the aristocracies of
position or attainment, the process does not publicly attempt to
cast them down, but is content .merely "to show their distinction
to be purely fictions," in which case "everyone would be pre.
. ,,193
pare d to a dm1re 1t.

The relationship between the admirer and the

eminent, whether king or aristocrat, is ended when
the admirer no longer cheerfully and happily acknowledges greatness, promptly expressing his appreciation, and then [rebels]
against its pride and arrogance . . . . The admirer and the
object of admiration stand like two polite equals, and observe
each other. 194
In a revolutionary age, an antagonistic relationship exists
between the king and his subjects.

However, far more destructively

in the reflective age,
a subject no longer freely honors his king or is angered at his
ambition . . . the subject ceases to have a position within
the relationship; he has no direct relation to the king but
simply becomes an observer and deliberately works out the
problem; ie. the relation of a subject to a king.l95
As a result of such subtle changes, "the established order of things
continues to exist," although emptied of all significance by the
.
.
196
re fl ect1ve tens1on.
Kierkegaard assumed that every social organization requires
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a principle of association, fulfilling the need for a factor to
unite individuals in the relationship.

In the passionate age,

which Kierkegaard finds to have certain moral advantages, people
are associated by enthusiasm.

In the coolly reflective age, however,

.
.
.
. 1 e. "197
envy serves as t h e " negat1ve
un1"f y1ng
pr1nc1p

Envy is the

desire to "live by comparisons," a life in which one's fortunes,
behavior, faith, and opinions must be "just like the others."

198

A common descriptive standard emerges for the "proper" styles of
life and opinion, to which each person is "entitled."
also becomes normative, and an offense to violate.

This standard

Envy provides a

sort of social cohesion as it unites people in their desire for a
common and mediocre form of life, keeping them comfortable in the
knowledge that no one is one's "better," while refusing to admit the
right of others to deviate from the standard.

Leveling is clearly

the natural outcome of such envy.
Although envy perversely fulfills to some extent and for a
time the political need for social cohesion, it ultimately brings
about the demoralization of public life and ultimate political dissolution.

"Men are disintegrated [as] when a book has become old and

shabby, the binding separates and the pages fall out. ,)

99

Society

and public life, consisting as they do of individual participants,
cannot long survive individual demoralization.

Outward forms of

public activity remain, but their existence becomes more and more
precarious.

Although "public life is carried on," Kierkegaard warns,

''it is we ourselves who are internally disintegrating" by lack of
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character.

200

The state thus becomes ungovernable, "a small market-

town" where "every government is an impossibility, because envy keeps
a watch on everything that is something, so that only contemptibility
can have a kind of power."

201

Government must falter because its

constituents have sacrificed true citizenship to privatistic reflection, which is arrogant and "too independent to be able to be content
with merely being represented." 202
In Kierkegaard's view, the phenomenon of envy is closely
related to the activity of the press because of journalism's role
in facilitating envy's demoralization of social life.

The relation

of the newspaper operator to envy "is like [that of] the cholera fly
to cholera; it cannot be said that i t is he who produces the demoralization (and everybody else is good) . . . but . . . he is and

,.,a-

remains the characterless instrument of envy and demoralization.""- ..;
Itself impervious to attack or envy, the press fuels the

"id~e

of the whole age," the desire to get "beyond 11 the next man.

fixee"

The

daily press works together with the public in anonymity to say what
. p 1 eases, wh.1 1 e " no one h as responsl. b.1 1.1ty." 204
1t

The irresponsible

press creates a climate of further irresponsibility on the part of
the public.
In 1848's bloodless revolution in Denmark, the perceptiveness
of Kierkegaard's observation was validated.

Rather than being

deposed or executed, the king had his authority removed from him in
the establishment of a constitutionally limited monarchy.

Whereas

this change was no doubt considered less than earth-shattering to
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the majority of his contemporaries, including many conservatives,
Kierkegaard himself perceived in it a verification of his thesis
that Denmark had suffered a progressive loss of authority on the
social and political scenes and a corresponding loss of the obedience
which had been dissolved in the acid of reflection, and that such
changes would bring about far-reaching political consequences.
Kierkegaard remarked that "in '48, the strands of worldly wisdom
broke, " 205 that the political upheaval validated his claim that
severe social demoralization and disintegration had long been at
. externa 11y p 1ac1.d Denmark . 206
wor k 1n

The first error lay with the government in its reliance on
attempting to outperform the opposition in worldly shrewdness.

The

government was to have been honored on account of its position of
207
.
.
.
aut h or1ty,
an d not b y v1rtue
of t h e c 1everness o f 1ts
o ff.1cers.

The king was to have borne his authority, not by virtue of some
alleged superiority which was his as an individual, but rather
because his authority was delegated from "the One who calls and
·
" the k'1ng.
des1gnates

208

The king erred in failing to claim the

authority pertaining to him qua official and to rule by means of it;
he rather ignored this authority and attempted to rule by cleverness.
Kierkegaard's main complaint against government was that
"it does not govern," it "does not use its power as it should"
.
d 1ts
.
.
.
209
b ecause it h as abd 1cate
own genu1ne
aut h or1ty.

Unlike

governments of old run by true statesmen, contemporary rulers fail
to take "the reins with vigor and a keenness for decision."

210
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Similarly, the aristocracy has forsaken its responsibilities; the
aristocrat has taken "his distinction in vain," rather than properly
using his responsibility to lead, even when this would involve opening
.
lf to publ"1c censure. 211
h 1mse
Thus, according to Kierkegaard, there has been a breakdown
in the traditional notion of statesmanship.

Statesmanship had

previously been based on authority, while in Kierkegaard's day on
the contrary, "politics" rules, which bases decisions on what is
calculated to please the crowd.

The concern has shifted from "how

to be a cabinet minister" to "how to become a cabinet minister."
This dangerous trend can only lead to "the disintegration of states,
. rea 11 y no govern1ng
.
or ru 1"1ng. "212
f or t h ere 1s

Political authority

has been abdicated by those to whom it was entrusted, with disastrous
political consequences.

In a like vein, Kierkegaard pointed to a

lack of earnestness in political circles as evidenced by the proposal of a "temporary" income tax.

The appeal to temporariness

indicates a lack of seriousness in government, in that the tax was
proposed as a temporary measure merely in order to sidestep the
genuine issue of whether the tax measure itself was indeed desirabl e.

213

Corresponding to the errors of the government, the opposition
.
214
.
fun d amenta 1 ly ran a f ou 1 on the same quest1on
of aut h or1ty.

Those

who rebel against authority are forgetful of the meaning and "dialectic" of authority; authority is the "specific quality that comes
from elsewhere" and lights upon an otherwise undistinguished
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. d"1v1. dua 1 , g1v1ng
. .
h.1s utterances t h e f orce of comman ds. 215
1n

Thus,

the authority in question is not something to be grasped as if it
conferred some benefit on the individual, but is rather a transitory
factor to enable its possessor to fulfill a special social function.
The opposition's lack of insight on this matter was reflected in the
fact that the new officials set up by the revolutionary constitution
were unable to understand the nature of their own newfound authority.
Kierkegaard observed in a melancholy spirit that the ruling novices
had previously been much less successful at obeying their superiors
than those old officials would now be.
While we have today become accustomed to declamations of the
faceless Das Man, the mass man, by such figures as Martin Heidegger,
Ortega y Gassett, and Gabriel Marcel, Kierkegaard was the first to
discern the great processes towards association; its resultant
demands for social uniformity, its secular religiousity, and its
tendency toward tyrannical "people's governments."

Not only did he

delineate the features of the coming mass man, but he showed how his
advent was an inevitable result of social forces long underway, of
reflection which had turned human relationships into speculative
problems, and of the general breakdown in people's willingness to
submit to authority or to be represented.

The paternity of the mass

man could also be laid at the door of mass media and their irresponsible pronouncements which set the abstract crowd as an autonomous
arbiter of art, scholarship, and religion, as well as of government.
No saying of Kierkegaard's is more famous than that "the
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crowd is untruth."

216

Within the meaning of this slogan is the core

of Kierkegaard's social criticism in this period.

It describes the

movement away from monarchy to representation, and further away from
representation to the threatening mass social movements which enforce
"equality" by removing all social distinctions among men in favor of
a faceless uniformity.
In 1848, Kierkegaard had made clear both that the crowd is
thoroughly evil and that his own teachings on the individual must be
seen as being at least partially a corrective to the crowd-exalting
tendencies of his age.

Historical categories have changed, so that

whereas in the past, kings, nobles, and other elements of the established order were to be opposed on behalf of the people, now it is
precisely the "people" who are the enemy.

The evil crowd is now

hailed as "the authority"; the crowd is "untruth, the crowd is power
and honor."

217

Everything that the crowd does, the most horrible cruelty, is
good; it is the will of God. No eastern despot has been as
obsequiously served and flattered by cringing courtlings as the
crowd by journalists, by all the men of the moment.218
Kierkegaard held that the crowd's untruthfulness involves
suppressing the single individual, who alone can accept responsibility under God and who alone can truly judge according to his
lights in intellectual, spiritual, and religious fields.

Ironically,

although the crowd renders the individual irresponsible and assumes
the responsibility itself, it is still unquestionably the individuals within the crowd who do the harm--the crowd itself "has no
hands."

Similarly, ·it can only be the individual crowd member
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who has the "courage" to attack what is truly worthwhile, or in
Kierkegaard's potent example, to "spit on Christ," for the "crowd"
itself is "cowardly."

219

The individual indeed persists in the crowd,

and is only deluded in thinking that he exists only as a member of
that greater entity.
Following Aristotle, Kierkegaard believed that "man is a
"2 20

social animal, and what he believes in is the power of assoc1at1on.
0

0

The associative element is natural to humanity; "man is by nature an
animal creation" who therefore runs together "in a herd."

221

Yet,

Kierkegaard does not conclude that the very naturalness of "running
together in a herd" proves that there is no higher norm for human
behavior.

In defense of these higher claims, he remarks that "the

trJth is that in the herd one is free from the criterion of the
individual and of the ideal,"

222

which lamentably are the truly

human ideals.
The principle of association and its attendant dangers
becomes strongest when men become less confident in what it is that
makes them unique, their relationship to God and the consequent infusion by this relationship of autonomy and dignity into human life.
On an innocent level, he notes in his own period that "establishing
parties, forming schools, togetherness, etc., is precisely the error
of our t:tmes."
0
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Although he admits that there are ethically sound

reasons for joining together, too often people band together to
224
avo1od t h e1r appropr1ate su ff er1ng as 1n do1v1odua 1s.
0

0

0

0

Rue f u 11 y, Ko1erk e-

gaard foresees a day when men will lose themselves "atomistically in
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life's social throng . . . even to the experienced eye the human
race will become an ocean where it will be impossible to distinguish
between the hordes of infusoria who previously formed isolated existences."

225

The natural principle of association corresponding to

the human social impulse, when separated from the notions of human
individuality and responsibility, leads to a situation in which the
crowd becomes "everything" and the individual as such simply evaporates.
In a social "ocean" such as Kierkegaard has described, whatever is considered "truth" is determined by the crowd; the "view of
life" is followed "which holds that where the crowd is, there also is
the truth."

226

Kierkegaard's point is not that the crowd happens

frequently to judge wrongly, but that the crowd is essentially
untruth.

Truth is related necessarily to the individual, and is

impossible to be attained in the crowd situation.

If a situation

were imagined in which each member of a group individually possessed
the truth, the very fact of their entering into a crowd to ratify
their convictions, such that "the 'crowd' comes to have any deciding,
balloting, noisy, audible significance, untruth would nevertheless
be present at once . . . since the crowd either produces impenitence
.
"b"l"
or 1rrespons1
1 1ty. "227

When decisive significance is attributed

to the crowd, the crowd actually transforms into falsity what had,
when held individually, been truth. 228
In Kierkegaard's view, it is strictly impossible for a crowd
to be led or governed properly, for by definition, the "crowd is
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always misled"; if a crowd were truly to be led, it would no longer
exist qua crowd.

229

Thus, the crowd is essentially ungovernable,

which makes it less desirable and stable than even the most mediocre
rule~

and must yield to either anarchy or totalitarianism.
Their alternative manners of discerning truth are essential

to understanding individuals and groups, Kierkegaard believed, and
this casts light on the now sacrosanct practice of voting.

Because

of the pervasiveness of the principle of associativeness, it comes
naturally to man to see truth as "directly recognizable by way of the
majority."

23

°

Kierkegaard avers that the idea of deciding truth by

majority does have its proper legitimacy, but only within a strictly
circumscribed area of concern.

In policy or politics, narrowly con-

ceived, voting enjoys a certain justification, but it can have no
place in ethical, intellectual, or religious contexts.

The truth

that the crowd is in opposition to "eternal truth, which has nothing
to do with policy."

231

So, if there do exist matters having purely

to do with policy as distinct from the practice of government,
which has ethical content, then voting is legitimate.

Kierkegaard

clearly maintains that
in relation to everything finite and temporal, in relation to
eating, drinking, etc., in relation to all kinds of secular
activity and commerce in this world, no trustworthiness superior
to that of number is needed . . . . In relation to the temporal,
sensible, and finite there is (in the very nature of things) no
eternal trustworthiness; consequently the trJstworthiness of
number is entirely trustworthy. 232
Similarly, Kierkegaard grants that by means of voting, "street
lighting and clothes, and with all due respect, the sanitation
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department can be reformed." 233
A brief journal quotation by Schelling exemplifies Kierkegaard's own deep seated, Platonic apprehension of the crowd's
deciding truth:

"When it has come to the point where the majority

decides what constitutes truth, it will not be long before they take
. w1t
. h t h e1r
. f.1sts.' r 234
to dec1.d.1ng 1t

So wh"l
. pre1 e K"1erk egaar d 1s

pared to admit that "all finite matters are suitable by voting," he
is clearly committed to the doctrine that "nothing infinite can be
.
,,235
dec1"ddb
e
y vot1ng.

Matters of politics and prudence can be

decided by vox populi, but "truth" cannot, remembering that this
truth is qualitatively higher and is concerned with the questions
of man's relationship to God and to his ethical stance in relation to
other persons.

236

To decide questions of truth by voting is as
-,-7

inappropriate as using "a steelyard for weighing gold."_:,

The notion that the crowd is essentially untruth is expressed
in the remark that "we ought to become most suspicious precisely when
there get to be millions and millions, suspecious that this enormous
n~~

.
. 1y po1nts
b er s1mp
to somet h.1ng wrong. 11238

Kierkegaard's views

in the "present age" show the sharp discontinuity with his earlier
views inspired by Hegel or the Greeks, in which man en masse, in
the group or state, is considered to be humanity in its most elevated
form.

In his dissertation, he had held that the state has moral

significance, and that true virtue is only possible within the state,
an institution having among its functions the moral improvement of
men.

As Kierkegaard began to observe firsthand the characteristics
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of political life, he came to utterly repudiate his earlier position.
In the "present age," he had come to view the state as "a necessary
evil, in a certain sense a useful, expedient evil, rather than a
goo d . "239

The state attempts to substitute an abstraction for true

community, which can only be formed by individuals who are individuated by their relationship to God.

On the popular level, this

abstraction is known as "public opinion."

It finds philosophical

expression in what was taken to be the Hegelian notion of objective
spirit.

Kierkegaard believed that the system of Hegelianism had

already become dead in Denmark, and he could but wish the same fate
for the correlative "public."

240

The state is fundamentally "human egotism on a large scale
and in great dimensions," rather than the place to observe the
virtues "writ large," as Plato has held.

241

Since the state is

"human egotism in great dimensions," and "cannot go beyond this,"
Kierkegaard came to believe that the notion of the state having
moral significance and existing for the improvement of men was a
perverse illusion.

Although the state is capable of success in

making individuals "shrewdly prudent" in pursuing their self.
242 genu1ne
.
•
•
•
1nterest,
mora 1 1mprovement
1n
t h e state 1s
doubtful as being improved in a prison."

243

II •

JUSt as

Similarly, to advocate

the state as the environment for becoming virtuous "is just as
strange as would be the claim that the best place for a watchmaker
or an engraver to work is aboard a ship in heavy sea."

244

Clearly,

then, by this period of Kierkegaard's thought, the locus of moral
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development has shifted from that of the

earli~r

period; the relation

of the state to the moral development of the individual is now seen
as antithetical, whereas previously the state had been held to be a
necessary condition for individual virtue.
As noted, Kierkegaard believed that the age of the crowd
would lead to totalitarianism, to the tyranny of a "people's government."

Of all tyrannies, that of a people's government is especially

unbearable, Kierkegaard held, whereas an individual tyrant has at
least the virtue of being an identifiable person to be avoided or
defied; a tyranny of the people is inescapable.

Kierkegaard notes

that, in a people's government, "in a sense every man is the
tyrant."

245

Far from being remote, he is the next-door neighbor.

As envy serves as the negative unifying principle of this age, any
deviation from the accepted norm of fashion or thought may be viewed
as treasonable by the tyrant of the present and coming age, "'the
many,' 'the crowd,'

I

•

.

statJ.StJ.CS.

,,,246

Kierkegaard observed that in the age of dissolution, Christianity is disappearing and a new religiousness is appearing in its
place, which may or may not parade under the previous banner.
remarked

~ith

He

prophetic insight that whereas previous religious

reformations turned out to be in fact political, in the upheavals
to come, movements would appear to be political but really be religious.

247

Kierkegaard noted that during Denmark's bloodless revolu-

tion, "not a word about religiousness has been heard--not a single
one, "

248

all the more surprising because Denmark was officially ."a
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Christian country."

249

Secularity had become the ruling ideology of

the day, people having lost the conception of duty which was based
. 1"1gat1on
.
on oo
to Go d . 250

Kierkegaard attributes the moving force

behind the entire decline of the age to the lack of that content
which had once been derived from a Christian view of duty.

Men now

consulted with each other "instead of each one individually consult
ing with God." 251

As a result of the neglect of true religious duty

to God first and then to the other, religious, social and moral traditions "of a vanished past" can be but mere husks on which the
present generation must feed, not to be replenished by any "new infusion from on high."

252

The society for a time 1-vill keep its

external religious forms, while internally becoming secular in the
extreme.
This religious void is soon to be filled, however, the world
of the spirit abhorring a vaccum as does the world of physics.
new religion is demonic and idolatrous, "a new paganism."

The

The ten-

dency of the crowd is to wish to "be God, to want to be feared more
than God."

253

The self-deifying crowd is "like a pagan worshipping

the god he himself has made--it is about the same as worshipping
oneself."

254

255
.
.
Th e d 1abol1cal
crow d d eman ds wors h"1p.

Remarkably

astute was Kierkegaard's observation that "the idol . . . of our
age . . . is 'the crowd, '"

256

exemplifying the tendency to create a

new demonic religion rather than to settle for no religion at all.
Kierkegaard ironically suggests as a title for a book about
"5-1

the age of the crowd, "'Possession and Obsession in Modern Times.'"""

64

Kierkegaard sees striking parallels between medieval witchcraft and
the modern tendency of crowd gatherings in which people affiliate
"so that natural and animal rage will grip a person, so that he feels
. 1 ate d , 1n
. fl ame d , an d ausser s1c
. h . 11258
st1mu

Participation in a crowd

provides an intense emotional, quasireligious experience, to which
the witches' sabbaths pale by comparison.

In such an experience, not

necessarily restricted to the gathered crowd, the sense of being an
individual is lost and man becomes "outside of himself," not fully
knowing or in control of his actions, a participant in pagan
frenzy.

259

This religico-emotional counterpart to the more meta-

physical and sociological dimensions of Kierkegaard's concept of the
age of the crowd would have seemed overly dramatic in the context of
bourgeois Denmark in the mid-nineteenth century, though it was
recorded in private journals, but in view of such twentieth century
phenomena as the nighttime rallies in Nazi Germany, the accuracy of
Kierkegaard's observations appears to be unquestionable.
The phenomenon of leveling follows upon the demand of the
crowd, fueled by envy, to make everyone alike.

The desire "to be

like the others," to reduce everyone to copies, is an expression of
the degradation of envious mankind.

260

As man seeks the situation

which will be "coziest and most convenient," he pours out "evervigilant envy . . . upon any person who differs from the others."

261

Kierkegaard satirizes this view by remarking that although the
invention of photography has now made it within everyone's reach
to have his own portrait made, leveling makes eve1;one look alike,

65
so that now "only one single portrait is needed." 262
Kierkegaard traces the social decline from the previous age
in which individuals were represented by a few eminent persons to
the leveled state in which the quality of the whole race is reduced.
In the earlier time, people envisioned themselves represented by a
"few eminent individuals," the aristocracy of merit.

However,

"gradually the inferior element in the race triumphed; envy ascended
263
and Came to the top. "
uSlng
. th e b ru t e power of numb ers, th e crowd
strove to eliminate eminence while simultaneously trying to raise
their own status.

As a result, a degradation of the whole human race

ensues in which the very notion of being an individual human being
potentially related to God has become lost.

Man has become dehuman-

ized, stripped of his essential human qualities of responsibility,
264
dn ess, an d re 1"lglous
.
.
duty, se lf - d lrecte
so 1"1tu d e.

Kierkegaard

saw the need for men to take action to "make the end fast" by each
individual relating himself to the unconditioned source of values.
This source of their humanity itself lies outside of mankind and
provides a permanent reference point.

Without this relation to the

unconditioned, men and movements become "swirling whirlpools," notwithstanding their sometime surface stability.

265

In the period of leveling the relation to the unconditioned,
and along with it the concept of what it is to be a human being, has
been lost and mankind is indeed thrust into the whirlpool.

Power-

craving leveling eliminates all authority; it "cannot tolerate
character" and "cannot stand to have anyone stand at the head."

266

66

The concept of the ethical in public life, which is necessarily
person-centered, is doomed.
The principle of association, which has a rightful place in
material interests, lends a certain strength to the individual by
"numerical collectivization" but is destructive of morality. 267

The

progressive annihilation of the human essence destroys social vir.
.
k respons1"b"l"
tues, s1nce
no one ex1sts
to ta'e
1 1ty. 268
Kierkegaard foresaw the political and social situations that
leveling would bring forth, that all authority and distinction
would be ground down in an unstoppable process of disintegration in
which the virtues of the earlier historical stages would be forfeit.
Since persons in authority had made use of their qualitative distinctions qua individuals rather than relying strictly on their genuine
authority, they made themselves vulnerable to the leveling which
destroys personal distinctions and assisted in bringing the social
and political disintegration on themselves and society.
Kierkegaard believed himself to live in "dangerous times"
. wh.1ch " t h e wor 1 a, t1. d e 1s
. turn1ng.
.
n 269
1n

Although leveling and the

rise of the crowd had become so far advanced by 1850 that he believed
that the crowd had actually already been the dominant force in the
state for some time, he believed that at least one generation's time
would be required for this fact to become public knowledge.

270

Leveling is an historical process, a historical dialectic
. l p rov1"d ence wor ks. 271
t h rough wh 1c1

Kierkegaard could see his role

as neither in opposing nor in supporting the process; he rather saw

67

himself as a witness to what was transpiring, staying on the scene
intellectually to encourage any survivors to be recalled to individ.
. 1 e d out b y th e 1eve 1"1ng process. 272
ua 1 1. t y a ft er b e1ng
s1ng

The public abstraction leaves the insignificant person
living contentedly while it seeks out the outstanding individual.
This process, although recognized as occurring as early as 1850,
Kierkegaard also saw as "the battle of the future."

273

By doing

away with the individual, the leveling power eliminates intellectual
and moral ideals, since only an individual can be the bearer of
"d ea 1 s. 274

1

That Kierkegaard saw himself as an individual singled out

for leveling in the Corsair incident is apparent from the journal
entries; he is the one singled out for minutely detailed examination
in the popular press.

275

He too is the "religious person" who "comes

to be hated as proud, aristocratic, and the like" for his religiously
centered contempt for the mass movement.
free the individual. "

It is he whose task is "to

276

Within the leveling process; the "equal" rules, dictating
public habits and ideas.

Kierkegaard saw a period of "market-town

mentality" and "mutual petty cantankerousness" going to the absurd
extreme of people's loyalty being questioned because of their
dress.

277

Equality in this context is not based ontologically on

the individual's status that derives from the God relationship, but
. a numer1ca
. 1 , f a 1 se equa 1"1ty. 278
1s

In the leveling process the

abstract public comes to set normative standards, not only for
fashions, but even for areas requiring specialized knowledge, such

68

as scholarship, for example.

The false democracy of leveling as

carried out through the press absurdly encourages tavern keepers
to regard themselves as critical authorities on works of Latin
grammar.

279

When the crowd is treated as authoritative on matters of
"b"l"
.
.
. an lmpoSSl
.
trut h , JUStlCe
1S
1 1ty. 280

Leveling can seek but a

false equality, and as essentially worldly, it seeks to enforce
this equality by such secular means as political maneuvering and
. 1
.
.
281
numer1ca
assoc1at1on.

This "egalitarianism" must result in a

.
d own o f a 11 d"1st1nct1ve
.
.
. d"1v1. dua 1"1ty. 282
1eve 11ng
1n

Kierkegaard

believed that religion alone, as the true humanity, can fully express
equality properly so called, and this condition would destroy worldleness.

283

The attempt to found an egalitarian society on the

denial of the only true and fundamental basis of equality can only
result in totalitarianism and numerical abstraction, which in turn
must deny the individual by subordinating him to the group.
Upon intellectual and spiritual decay must follow social and
political unrest.

Religious leadership is lacking in consequence

of the clergy's abdication of spiritual leadership for political
opportunism.

284

The radical age of leveling seeks to eliminate

the genuine, "venerable old traditions" which stand in the way of
any social change which is based on a reductionist view of man.
However, Kierkegaard astutely observed that "tradition" can also be
of service to revisionists; "as soon as possible," they "themselves
substitute traditions, traditions establishad by artificial means,"
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such as the press, "which suit these benefactors of the human
race."

285
Due to such false equality and to envy, the political develop-

ments of the age of leveling take a decided turn from those of other
periods.

In addition to political controversies, the age of

leveling sees internicene social upheaval as well, "disturbances
in the state similar to those in a house where the residents of the
various floors begin to fight--not with the caretaker but among
themselves."

286

Because "historical categories have changed," political reform
can no longer focus on overthrowing monarchs.

History is now "turning

back again to the ancient forms" in which it was plainly seen that
the crowd is more disruptive than any single despot.

Consequently,

warfare will no longer be the predominant form of upheaval and
strife, but rather "constant internal disturbance" as in ancient
times of internal decay when the plebians were pitted against the
patricians.

287

Internal political unrest in this period follows upon

the disruption of social order.

Kierkegaard saw this observation

verified in his own time in the 1848 revolution, founded not on
firmly held convictions but on mob sensibilities when 15,000 people
advanced on the king's castle.

This "brutish cowardice" was a prime

example of the lack of responsibility in the age of leveling leading
to political change.

288

True government becomes impossible in the age of leveling,
because relations between the gpvernment and the subjects have
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.
.
289
b ecome a re 1 at1on
o f re fl ect1on.

In the demoralized condition of

modern society, the public has become the tyrant, although not "in
.
"290
off 1ce.

The mass tyrannically "rules" the state with the cooper-

291 h
.
.
. h "t h e great means of
at1on
o f t h e press,
w o ass1sts
ev1"1 w1t

communication."

292

Among its fearsome tools is chatter, idle gossip

about personal characteristics and idiosyncracies of leaders which
at once satisfies idle curiosity, indulges envious sentiment, effectively silences dissent against the tyranny of the public, and
invests any decisive action on the part of any government leader with
fearsome personal consequences.

293

In view of Kierkegaard's polemic against the crowd and leveling's mass man, it is frequently maintained that he was a misanthropic thinker.

Supporting this view, as held by Marjorie Grene,

294

is such a quote as this from the journals:
No, I have wanted to get to know men, and I could not have been
more stragetically placed to gain a knowledge of men, which has
had infinite value for me, although at the same time it 295aches
me, I must say, that there is very little value in men.
It is essential to view such a remark in context, however;
Kierkegaard does not deny the value of persons as individuals.
Rather, he argues that naive men have been deluded and corrupted by
the press.

296

Seen individually, there is a great deal about men

that is lovable and worthwhile.
only as they become "the public."

Man present their loathsome side
On his own attitudes towards

others, Kierkegaard reports that "I cannot stop being fond of the
common man, even though journalistic scurrility has done everything
to confuse him in his relationship to me and spoils from me what I

71
loved so unspeakably . . . living together with the common man." 297
For one who took genuine pleasure in associating with everyday people, this rather conciliatory remark is all the more to be
viewed with surprise, since after the Corsair incident, Kierkegaard
had become an object of ridicule to the public.
had become difficult to perform in peace.

Even mundane tasks

From the religious aspect,

he viewed living together with the common man on a peer basis to be
his Christian duty.

It was his high regard for humanity which led

him to decry the modern social situation which had based society on
a proletarian class, "a substructure of men who are totally ignored
.
.
"298
an d exc 1 u d e d f rom persona 1 assoc1at1on.

Kierkegaard continued

to see both religious and personal significance in his relations
with the common man, towards whom he felt not antipathy but continued
.
299
a ff ect1on.

Viewing men's complicity in the social deterioration

process as stemming more from ignorance than from willful evil, he
regarded his own literary work as an educational corrective intended
to increase awareness of how greatly the common man had been bewildered by those who ought to know and act better, by the press and
the liberal establishment who led the way into the leveling process.

300

Kierkegaard continually saw himself as a religious writer, so
it is not surprising that he saw religious significance in the
social and political changes which he discerned in Europe.

Kierke-

gaard thought of social responsibility as being expressed in religious love and in political, social, and religious fellowship.

The
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connection between social and political concerns and the religious
dimension is central in Kierkegaard's social thought.

In Herbert

Marcuse's opinion, Kierkegaard restored religion to its revolution. 1 f orce. 302
ary f orce as a potent soc1a

The fact remains, however,

that Kierkegaard maintained a sharp distinction between the roles
of church and state, and between one's respective duties to each.
A subject has a duty to honor and obey the rulers out of love for
God, although essentially one is a citizen of heaven.

Christianity

differs from politics in the respect that the former receives its
vital content from divine infusion, whereas political novelty is
derived from "the street," from prudence and public opinion.

303

Christianity is unconcerned with nationalism; for the Christian,
II

• II must b e cons1• d ere d 1rre
•
1evant. 304
po 1'1t1cs

As was Christ himself,

Christianity must be indifferent to every specific form of government. 305

whereas Christians have dealings with the secular world,

in the religious sphere their dealings are exclusively with one
another. 306

Religion thrives in a religious subculture, "a little

society of its own" composed of people who are "polemical to the
utmost toward society in the usual sense."

307

Christianity~~

cannot be formed into a political party, for to form an organization
. sue.h a way wou ld b e to put f a1t
. h 1n
. numb ers. 308
1n

Ch r1st1an1ty
· · ·
·
1s

untrue to itself when it pays attention to the crowd and ignores the
individual:

"From a Christian point of view I do not have the right

to ignore existentially one single man.

I have the right to ignore

. . . the public, . . . but not actual man."

309

Rather than to

73

ignore the crowd, however, Kierkegaard believed that Christianity
310
. soc1a
. 1 monstros1ty.
.
oug h t to re f orm t h 1s
It is a disastrous situation when Christianity has become
established by government; "the emperor has no right to what belongs
3
to God." ll

The notion of a Christian state is "a self-contradic-

tion,"312 because "God's cause" cannot be served by secular assistance.

313

The union of church and state is the ruination of both

parties, of the church because of its fundamental aloofness from
things political, and of the state because that institution actually
needs the heterogenous mixture of religious "infinity" beside its
own "finitude" to serve as a moral and spiritual counterweight to the
state's stance of practical policy in order to maintain a positive
"dynamic tension."

314

A politically domesticated church, for all

of its short-term benefits to the state, unwittingly conduces to
revolution and ser1es to advance the public's moral disintegration.

315

Kierkegaard blamed the clergy even more than the rulers for
the social disintegration of which 1848 saw the outcome.

316

Rather

than having taught Christianity as politically indifferent, thus
serving their counterweight function, they became involved in actual
. .

po 1 1t1CS.

317

In the concrete, however, political ''powers that be" would
not be served if genuine Christianity came to be preached.

In fact,

"Christianity in the eminent sense [i.s] dangerous to the state, ,,3l 8
and the moral emphasis of Christianity stands ever vigilant to
challenge political expediencies.

Yet, what often may pass for

74

Christianity, a compromised institution, can do a genuine disservice
319
.
.
to t h e state by 1ea d1ng
to its demora 1·1zat1on.

Th e ch urch a 1one

can fulfill the need to reform individual social constituents of
the state:

the need for this reformation is greater than that for

changes of policy.

True reform requires a proper standard which

. .
re 1 1g1on
a 1one can prov1. d e. 320

CHAPTER V

THE AGE OF THE INDIVIDUAL A.l\JD COMMUNITY

Leveling, the great social breakdown following upon the
age of reflection, inevitably destroys all distinctively individual traits among men in society leading to a great uniformity in
human characteristics.

This process is not really the doing of

any person or group but "the work of reflection in the hands of an
abstract power."

It

is a social movement which can be calculated

much as an economist can plot trends and make predictions, or "in
the same way that one calculates the diagonal in a parallelogram
of forces."

321

No "heroes" can arrest its progress, and any asso-

ciation \vhich may be formed to oppose it must become an unwitting
.

ally of the leveling power merely by virtue of rely1ng on numbers.

322

Kierkegaard's pessimism regarding social movements does not
lead to despair, however, because although the leveling process proceeds "like an all consuming trade wind," the process will lead to
the eventual establishment of a new entity, the individual, which
Kierkegaard believes will initiate a new social development.
Through the leveling process, "each individual for himself may
receive once more a religious education," becoming singled out once
again as individuals before God, so that "for them, it will indeed
be an education" to live in the age of leveling.

323

By experiencing

the trauma of this period, such individuals will develop their
75

76

personal characteristics ru1ew in religious, aesthetic, and intellectual fields.

A new enthusiasm will be theirs as they come to see

the individual and social potential of realizing their true humanity,
of being "a man and nothing else, in the complete egalitarian
sense."

324

In the age of dissolution the "people" abolishes the royalty,
nobility and clergy as social and political aristocracies.

325

Then

in the age of leveling, a "self-combustion of the human race'' is
evident in which the dominant category of the "people" must yield to
the dialectical principles of its own destruction it bears latently
within it; "it is now 'the people' which must be demolished" by "the
. 1 e 1n
. d"1v1. d ua 1 . "
s1ng

326

This emergent single individual is now effi-

cacious in "chopping up this enormous abstraction, the people."

327

Writing in 1848, he remarked that "it will be a long time before world
.
.
. 1 e 1nalv1aua
. '. . ' 1 . .,328
h 1story
arr1ves
at t h e s1ng

Before the age of the

single individual will have arrived, political disintegration must
.
.
b rea k up t h e great nat1on
states 1nto

1

sma~

1 er po 1"1t1ca.
. 1 ent1t1es.
. .
329

The age of the individual, the last world-historical event
described by Kierkegaard, will be qualitatively superior to the ages
which have passed before.

The individual's appearance makes possible

the reparation of the failed authority, having collapsed when people
had lost sight of the human religious dimension which alone can
. 11 y respons1. bl e.
ren der man soc1a

.

.

person w1ll be recogn1zed.

331

330

~an

In this age, the value of every
in his associations will cease to

.
d as super1or
.
. d"lVl. dua 1 . 332
to man as an 1n
b e v1ewe
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Widespread misinterpretation of Kierkegaard as an antisocial
philosopher has been engendered by a misunderstanding of the emphasis
on man as individual.

This emphasis is not unsocial, however,

because it is precisely as an individual that man's social responsi333
b 1. 1.1ty tru 1y b ecomes a poss1. b.1 1.1ty.

The individual who emerges in

this age does not merely speak of justice while refusing to perform
it, as the crowd has done.

Rather, the individual will risk his

personal stake in life to make a contribution to social life.

334

iibat is radical about Kierkegaard's position is that even as
regards social concerns, the great need is not for political action
and what it can bring about, but for what the solitary individual
can achieve through developing the religious dimension of his life.

335

The truth, or the "idea," which the ''people" en masse could never
attain and which is necessary to build the bonds of social life, is
. 1 e 1n
. d"1v1. dua 1 . 336
ava1"1 a bl e to every s1ng

The single individual,

which of course might be any individual or even each one of them,
can achieve the "truth," to which God stands as a middle term.

337

Included in the content of this truth is a clarification of what is
involved in being a human being,
alone truly equalize men.

339

338

the God-relationship which can

Secular attempts to enforce "equality"

by external social manipulation lead inevitably, in Kierkegaard's
.
.
.
340
v1ew,
to mass d e h uman1zat1on.

Only religion alone is entitled to

. o f ,, true h uman1ty.'
.
,341
t h e c 1a1m

Kierkegaard believed that the highest development of the
relationship of individuals to one another would be a stage in which

78
each "individual is primarily related to God, and then to the commun1. t y. ,,342

Clearly, in Kierkegaard's view, the individual's relation

to God is the primary or "highest" relation in which ma.Tl is engaged,
and yet the individual "does not neglect the second" relation,
.
343
commun1ty.

.
A c 1 ear perspect1ve
on t h e notion of community as

Kierkegaard presents it will resolve the difficulty seen by such
authors as Niebuhr who believe that "cultural societies do not concern

Kierkegaard, "
345

problem" ·

h erm1' t . "346

344

that Kierkegaard has "abandoned the social

in "cultivating the exclusive Christianity of the
Kierkegaard opposed the tendency to associate, it is true,

but the associativeness that he opposed was of a specific, degenerate
type; it was a gratification of herd instincts and a craven desire
for security in which the distinci tvely human is forgotten .. Kierkegaard's ultimate philosophical contribution is a well-considered
concept of community in which the shortcomings of the previous movements, those which had come under his fiercest criticism, are overcome.
Hermann Diem has accurately characterized Kierkegaard's
position in stating that for Kierkegaard it is "not till an individual
has won an ethical bearing in the face of the whole world" will he
34 7
.
b e strong enough to tru l y un1te .

In Kierkegaardian community, the

. d'1v1. dua 1 , an d not t h e commun1ty,
.
. t h e h.1g,h est e l ement. 348
1n
1s

As

a spiritual being, man has a need "for a kind of certainty other
than nuinbers,"

349

that is, to be primarily related to God, and then

related to one another in community.
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Kierkegaard's social analysis predicted that world-historical
progress would establish the age of community.

After the age of

individuality in which the distinctively human begins to reappear,
"social life must again play its role to the utmost degree." 350
There will be a return to social life reminiscent of the Greek ideal
of the polis, with the important difference that no individual by
virtue of social status or talents needs to be excluded from full
participation.

Whereas in an earlier age, a premature forerunner, a

witness, to the longing for this sort of association was found in the
founding of groups and parties, the genuine community of which Kierkegaard speaks is one in which the notion of community "must of
necessity return richer and fuller," in that social life now has
the benefit of "the diversity of individuality."
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The single

individual is the presupposition for the forming of community.

The

bond which lends social cohesiveness is derived from the nature of
the individual.

The community is a "sum of ones," each one respon.

sible for and "guaranteeing" the commun1ty.

352

Here as for Plato,

the single individual is viewed as "a microcosm who qualitatively
reproduces the cosmos."
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As the individual gains responsibility

before God and other men, genuine vitality and progress are possible
. t h e soc1a
. 1 rea 1 m. 354
1n

The prototype of community for Kierkegaard, as for Plato,
is the family, although for Kierkegaard its emergence had been
.

.

divinely instituted, rather than occasioned by econom1c needs.
Like the family, larger communities display "a unity" in which

355
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disparate individuals unite "in the most intimate interrelation." 356
Indeed, in the family, the bonds which the acid of reflection had
corroded are again reestablished, the child and the adult each
realizing "its own eccentric possibility" and providing "a corrective
for each other" in the family unit. 357
Social action in the age of community begins with the fundamental principle that "all men are equal before God, therefore
essentially equal."
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Such equality is established by partners in

the relation, an equality, which secular movements such as communism
had "made such a big fuss about."

Social reform in the age of

community, according to Kierkegaard, is a natural outworking of
ontological equality, based on voluntary cooperation between equal
individuals who gladly perform "works of love" on one anothe.r's
behalf.
.

.

359

J.n SOCJ.ety.

This practical neighbor-love makes a great difference
360

With regard to the distribution of society's benefits,
Kierkegaard held that Christianity does not abolish distinctions,
but wills them to hang loosely.
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Now it may be natural to think

of an ideal society as one in which the possession of these goods
is equalized.

Kierkegaard quotes Fichte as noting that in the

French Revolution, the ideal of fraternal love was that "property,
marriage, family, and even the diversity of talents and capabilities
.

are suppose d to d J.sappear.

,362

This is clearly not the sort of

social reform that Kierkegaard believes is to be the result of
equality in the age of community:

rather than being based on love
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and a recognition of the humanity of the other, reform of that sort
was founded on an egotism that demanded that "if I do not have this
advantage, then on one else ought to have it either."

363

For Kierkegaard, social reform is not disregarded as Zuidema
supposes, but is seen within the parameters of the inevitability of
.

~nterpersona

1 d"~ ff erences ~n
.

.

as we 11 as

possess~ons

. .

capac~t~es.
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The external enforcement of uniformity is "politics," which is mere
"egotism dressed up as love."
. hb or as

ne~g

t1

365

t h e ab so 1ute 1y true

True equality recognizes the
.

express~on

366
.
n
o f h uman equa 1 ~ty.

Convinced then of the absolute worth of the other, human
social equality, the practical outworking of neighbor love, is to be
.

achieved in one of two ways, each involving self-denial.

36-1

For the

less fortunate, the individual who has less external goods, the
recommendation is to remove the distinction "essentially" by
"patiently [reconciling] yourself to the

-;;68

fact."~

For the individ-

ual who finds himself with more, a conviction of equality and neighbor love should issue in a forfeiture of privilege, in "a resolve
to

. ve up somet h"~ng or everyt h"~ng.' ,369

g~

This involves not only a

desire to let distinctions hang loosely, but to manifest disregard
for "differences in earthly life" by actively and sacrificially
engaging in material aid to the less fortunate.

In both of these

ways, social change issues "from the good," from the recognition
that secular differences are unimportant in contrast to the absolute
value of neighbor love.
Neighbor love then is the "true equality," "universal,
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unconditional, and derived from and motivated by God." 370

This must

issue in genuine action on the part of those who have more of the
world's goods.

There is an inescapably practical social involvement

in the Kierkegaardian notion of neighbor love; i t is an active
principle rather than a sentimental posture.

Love for one's neigh-

bor does not specifically intend to "establish democracy, promote
social legislation, or dethrone kings"; while love does not render
all individuals into copies of one another, it does indeed treat them
. d'1v1'duate db y t h e Go d re 1 at1ons
·
h'1p. 371
a l 1'k e as equa 1 s 1n
Kierkegaardi~•

reform faces the age-old dilemma of reli-

giously based social movements that faced, for example, the Buddha:
is emphasis to be given to political and external change, or to
internal reformation?

Unlike the activist, Kierkegaard embraces the

latter, the reformation of the person as the presupposition of social
.

1mprovement.
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In Kierkegaard's view, both the eminent and the lowly must
relinquish their specific advantages and disadvantages, "lifting
themselves above" their social distinctions based on accidents of
birth, position, circumstance, and education.

Nonetheless, he

insists that such distinctions are an indelible feature of earthly
life; these must be voluntarily emptied of significance rather
373
than attacked d1.rectly.

Th'
· a str1·k·1ng 1y reverse
, 1s process 1s

parallel to the "tension" by which one empties other people's positions of their significance while leaving outer structures intact,
although the moral difference between these concepts is as great as
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that between theft and charity.
The worldly approach to living with distinctions is td grant
them a decisiveness between persons, allowing that the distinguished
should rightfully relate only to others of their classes while
maintaining a superior attitude toward those of lower station.

Simi-

larly, in the "tension" lowly are expected to envy and resent the
distinguished.

Kierkegaard prudently surmises that his suggestion of

the ethics of neighbor love will be viewed as scandalous:

he advo-

cates forsaking one's own privileges to the extent that one comes to
truly identify with others regardless of their station, living out
374
.
.
.
.
.
. h
t h e perspect1ve
o f equa 1'1tar1an1sm,
an d cast1ng
ones 1ot w1t
"human likeness,"
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The ethic demands that "honour, power, and

glory lose their worldly gloss:· in company with God you cannot
. .
reJolce
over t h em. 11376

In a higher sense, Kierkegaard sees religious and political
concerns as unified, albeit with religion predominating in the mix377
.
ture an d prov1. d'1ng t h e d'1rect1on.

Social concern must not be

confined to worldly, activistic "doing good"; while not ignoring
this important function, the reformation of the person logically
.

must come f1rst.

378

Nonetheless faith is action, and Kierkegaard sees the great
coming cor.flict within religion to be not primarily doctrinal, but
a question of life commitment:

"The problem will become that of

loving the 'neighbor,' attention will be directed to Christ's life,
and Christianity will also become essentially accentuated in the
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direction of conformity to his life."

379

The social unrest generated

by legitimate grievances of the oppressed calling for action on the
part of Christianity finds satisfaction in the age of community.
Thus, as put by one writer,
for Kierkegaard the central issue
is that a person, while
continually relating absolutely to the absolute, is to practice
his love within the relative world of the social and political.
But here can never be absolute solutions . . . in the relative
situations, because they belong to finitude and have their
limitations.380
Kierkegaard thus believed that community, a future worldhistorical stage, as well as a present possibility to a lesser
extent, is achieved by the voluntary association of individuals
united intimately in common bonds of respect, cooperation, and love.
Community is predicated on the ontological status of each person as
an equal singled out by God, rather than on politically contrived
equality.
Social problems are of great concern to community, which is
guided by its social ethic, the performance of good works to benefit
others arising from neighbor love.

Further, there is in this concept

a return to a situation somewhat reminiscent of the Greek political
ideal, an aristocracy of merit, in which each individual regardless
of external circumstances or personal abilities is capable of full
participation in a vital, organic society.

This concept of community

is not intended, however, to be regarded as an unrealizable utopian
ideal, although a full realization of the concept is not expected
in the foreseeable future.

Kierkegaard sees community as a guiding

principle to be followed in groups of individuals, as well as an
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actual future situation resulting from world-historical processes
which were already underway in Kierkegaard' s time.
Although Kierkegaard would strenuously resist such a line of
approach, it must be asked how closely the notion of community is
bound to the Christian faith per se.

Is it possible to accept the

Kierkegaardian ideal of community without and apart from a specific
commitment to the Christian religion which Kierkegaard embraced?
This is to inquire how well the community ideal applies outside of
the particularly religious orientation prescribed for it by Kierkegaard.

In response, it would seem that to qualify, any intellectual-

spiritual commitment must successfully meet the needs for establishing genuine ontological equality for each individual, establishing
a basis of authority and submission, and providing for neighbor love.
Some agency is required to establish equality based not on merely
external features of human life such as social class or economic
status, and not enforced by means external to the individual.

Fur-

ther, if t:1is commitment were also able to fully ground an ethic in
which each person seeks the other's good as much or more than his
own, then it could meet the high standards of Kierkegaardian Christian community without necessarily tying it to a particular religious
commitment.
hlli~anist,

\fuether any other commitment, religious or secular

could in fact fulfill these functions is beyond the scope

of this analysis.
James Collins, however, believes that any such attempt to
secularize Kierkegaard's social perspective is fundamentally
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anti-Kierkegaardian:
Kierkegaard's thought runs counter to the naturalistic effort
to dissociate the doctrine of equality from its basis in religion
and to support it solely by scientific and utilitarian arguments.
The latter cannot stand alone, because they cannot supply a·
normative reason for respecting every man or a sufficient foundation for equality, in view of the obvious and important inequalities between men.381
Collins indicates that for Kierkegaard i t is God who is "at once
the well-spring of individuality and the source of human community,"
and in this role He is irreplaceable.
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In evaluating the Kierkegaardian social and political outlook,
it is evident that nowhere in it is to be found a definite program
for reform of the sort that could inspire politicians.

Kierkegaard's

position focuses on the underlying ethical positions and views of
human nature which ontologically ground various social and political
organizations, rather than suggesting definite plans of action.

This

lack of a reform program does not derive from a satisfaction with
the status quo.

Kierkegaard is not a class-oriented conservative

seeking to preserve aristocratic social and economic interests.

As

we have noted, he recognized that the social conditions of his time
had deteriorated severely, in that a large proletariat of unrecognized,
neglected, and dehumanized men had been created, a group upon which
the state rests economically while simultaneously denying them political expression.

Kierkegaard strenuously maintains that such a

situation is immoral.

The question facing the Kierkegaardian pers-

pective is whether his program of speaking to the individual in his
ethical solitude, while eschewing active political involvement, is
adequate as a response to existing social and political evils.

His
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approach might appear to be a quietistic philosophy of resignation to
concrete realities which focuses impotently on the inner life.
A proper response to this question must begin by admitting
that Kierkegaard's social and political thought is perhaps distressingly noncommittal in terms of necessary activity in the political
realm.

The indifference with which the spiritually oriented citizen

is supposed to regard political authority certainly appears not to
be an adequate basis for a truly well-rounded political philosophy,
no matter how much necessary emphasis Kierkegaard gives to such
considerations as the ontological basis of equality, which it seems
has been regularly ignored by other political philosophers.

It may

then be argued that in the final analysis, Kierkegaard has offered
us a political perspective that is severely defective in its minimization of the essential ingredient of activism.
To clarify Kierkegaard on this point, it must first be
remarked that he never expressly offers a fully developed social
and political philosophy as such, but that as we have termed it,
there is a social and political perspective throughout his philosophical thought.

The significance of this difference is discernible

when Kierkegaard's purpose in his authorship is recognized.

Closer

in spirit to Nietzche than to Hegel, Kierkegaard never proposed to
provide a full-blown systematic philosophy; rather, he saw his role
as being a philosophical and spiritual corrective, and called
himself a "spy" in the service of God, likening himself to "the
shoes that pinch."

383

Kierkegaard did not repudiate committed

88

concern for specific and concrete social policy, though such concerns
did not occupy the center of his vision.

He deplored. the formulation

of social and political concerns into questions of sheer political
policy which place efficiency and economy above philosophical and
spiritual scruples, precisely because he saw a more fundamental reformation to be necessary within modern man's philosophical and spiritual
perspectives on himself.
An illustration of Kierkegaard's peculiar personal relation to

social and political concerns can be found in the more familiar territory of his relation to state religion in Denmark.

Kierkegaard

certainly believed a great deal to be amiss in the state church,
much of it owing to the fact that it was politically established.
Since every native Dane was considered a member of the government
patronized church, the church had consequently become a safe and
delapidated "ploughhorse," rather than the vigorous steed that it
rightly should have been.

To Kierkegaard's contemporaries, it

seemed transparently obvious that his support could be expected in
the free church movement in Denmark.

By means of this external

reformation of church structure, it was believed that a great many
of the problems of the state church were remediable.

In view of

Kierkegaard's stringent opposition to the state church, surely he
could be expected to support those programs for external change
which were seen as particularly efficient means of reform.
Kierkegaard's response to such free church spokesmen as Dr.
Rudelbach was quite different from the expected reaction, however.

89

Objecting that Rudelbach and others seriously misunderstood his
position, Kierkegaard affirmed that his concern was not for the
policy-oriented option of disestablishing the church, but rather to
call for an inner reformation on the part of Danish Christians.

He

objected strenuously to the use which had been made of his writings
to support the free church movement because he refused to be cast in
the role of a reformer of external circumstances, thus obscuring his
real concern.

He saw himself dialectically related to state Chris-

tianity, not seeking to destroy the external and political situation
of the church, but rather to preach against what men had allowed
themselves to become within it.
As we draw the analogy to his general relation to political
reformation from his relation to church reform, we see Kierkegaard
as having defined his role in terms of the attempt to elicit inward
change, as one whose relation to society is such that he "risks
everything to contribute something so that it might become better
and good might come."
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His self-appointed task was not to work

out a complete theory of political authority, but rather to call
individuals to responsibility in the social and political situations
in which they found themselves, always with the belief that appropriate policy decisions can only result from proper inward orientation.

Perhaps a deficiency can be found in this approach to concrete

political and social problems in that it is idealistic and imprac. 1 , b ut t.h.1s lS
. at any rate K1er
. k egaar d 's pos1t1on.
. .
385
t1ca

1bere is nonetheless a great deal of positive content to
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Kierkegaard' s social and political thought.

Having left the door

open for activity of a political nature by granting that appropriate
decisions of policy can be legitimately made by associations of
. d"lVl"dua 1 s, 386 h"1s own ro 1e comp 1 ements t.h"1s practical
concerne d 1n
activity by providing social change with a "soul."

Kierkegaard

saw his task as pointing out the centrality of the relation of the
individual to society and to political authority.

His position has

the unique strength of seeing genuine equality and individual responsibility as the metaphysical grounding of any well-ordered sociopolitical entity.

Within his notion of community is a principle of

social cohesion which locates the interpersonal bond within both
man's own nature and the relation of the person to the unconditioned.
This view stands in exalted contrast to purely secular social
theories, such as contractual theories which view social bonds as
essentially formed on economic self-interest rather than on intrinsic
bonds of fellowship between individuals.
In conclusion, it will be well to mention Werner Stark's
discussion of the relative merits of the social programs of activists
(he is speaking particularly of Harx) and of Kierkegaard.

From

Stark's discussion, it is evident that contrary to appearances it
is Kierkegaard rather than the activist whose analysis is the more
thoroughgoing and whose program is the most

"realistic.~r

For

Kierkegaard, "individualism and egalitarianism are . . . fused
together into a higher unity.

An ideal society presupposes both:

the stronger the individuals the firmer also the social bond. "
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The unified egalitarianism which Kierkegaard believed to be "the
very idea of religionn 388 is found when individuals learn to practice domination of self rather than domination of others.

389

Stark

credits Kierkegaard for realistically holding that social equality
would never be realized until men could vanquish their urge toward
.
.
. 1.
se lf -pre f erence, 390 a v1ctory
wh.1ch wou ld requ1re
true se lf - den1a

As Stark believes, and is also the conclusion of this thesis, far
from being a "dreamer," Kierkegaard was "in the last analysis
.
"391
a rea 1 1st.
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